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V. Conclusion 
Although pretrial litigation often seems to render trial on the 
merits something of an anti-climax, adversarial adjudication is of 
course the focus of the criminal justice system, military or civilian.1 
Once trial on the merits has begun, trial and defense counsel natu-
rally utilize the rules of evidence in the fashion most likely to make 
the most of the evidence available to thBm. Yet, as all lawyers are 
aware, the period since the enactment of the Uniform Code of Mil-
itary Justice has brought sweeping changes not only in military 
criminal law, but also in the "constitutionalization" of the law of 
evidence. Increasingly, considerations of compulsory process and 
confrontation play important roles in determining what evidence 
can be obtained and used at trial. Accordingly, this article under-
takes to review the law applicable to the procurement and admission 
of evidence on the merits2 in the armed forces in light of the Sixth 
Amendment rights to compulsory process and confrontation. 3 Such a 
review necessarily entails a considerations of matters which are 
generally considered procedural, primarily the law applicable to 
witness procurement, as well as matters clearly evidentiary in 
nature. 
1Ironically, the large number of guilty pleas in both civilian and military law often 
renders trial on the merits the rarity rather than the usual rule. Notwithstanding this, 
the entire criminal justice system is oriented around the contested trial, which thus 
supplies a normative standard. 
2Although the rules of evidence do apply to sentencing proceedings in the armed 
forces, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Rev. ed.), para. 75; Mil. R. 
Evid. 1101, this article will deal only with trial on the merits. 
3This article will not, therefore, generally address the innumerable questions inher-
ent in the Military Rules of Evidence. 
3 
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I. THEBURDENSOFPROOF AND PRODUCTION 
Because burdens of proof and production, like presumptions, 4 are 
substitutes for evidence and dictate which party must address and 
prove an issue, no discussion of the law relating to the procurement 
and admission of evidence can be undertaken without consideration 
of the burdens of proof and production. In In re Winship,5 the 
Supreme Court held that "the Due Process Clause protects the 
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is 
charged."6 Winship left open what facts werre necessary "to consti-
tute the crime". The Court appears to have clarified its intent in 
Patterson v. New York7 by holding that the legislature may constitu-
tionally define a crime in whatever fashion it deems desirable and 
may then require a defendant proven to have committed the unlaw-
ful conduct to carry the burden of proving the application of any 
exception to the statute the legislation chooses to recognize.s As a 
result, those matters, such as insanity, which excuse the offense but 
4Although the Supreme Court has clearly permitted various forms of presumptions 
in criminal cases, whether statutory or common law, Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S. 
837 (1973), it has yet to expressly indicate the necessary relationship between the basic 
fact and the presumed fact. See id (stating that the court need not choose between the 
different tests of "more likely than not" or beyond a reasonable doubt as possession of 
stolen property gave rise to the presumed fact of guilty knowledge beyond a reasona-
ble doubt); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 (1970) (suggesting need for a 
beyond a reasonable doubt standard); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969) 
(statutory presumption must be more likely than not given the underlying fact); Totv. 
United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943) (presumption is invalid if there is no rational 
connection between the basic and presumed facts). See generally E. Imwinkelried, P. 
Giannelli, F. Gilligan & F. Lederer, Criminal Evidence 377-88 (1979). The topic of 
presumptions is complex. See generally Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in 
Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 Harv. 
L. Rev. 321 (1980). 
5397 u.s. 358 (1970). 
6ld. at 364. See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979) (on appeal the 
question is whether the evidence of record "could reasonably support a finding of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt".) Although the Court in Winship refers to "every fact 
necessary to constitute the crime," it is clear that that language means that every 
"element of the offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Mullaney v. 
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975) (use of the word, "element"). 
7432 U.S.197 (1977). Compare Patterson v. New York, with Mullaneyv. Wilbur, 421 
u.s. 684 (1975). 
8432 U.S. at 210. Patterson necessarily limits Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 
(1974). Compare Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210-16, with Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698-99. 
Although this is a reasonable synthesis of the Court's decision in this area, there may 
well be limits beyond which neither Congress nor any other legislature may not go. 
See, e.g., Allen & DeGrazia, The Constitutional Requirement of Proof Beyond Reasona-
ble Doubt in Criminal Cases: A Comment Upon Incipient Chaos in the Lower Courts, 20 
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1982) (arguing that the Court could tie the reasonable doubt 
requirement to due process standards created by the common law). 
4 
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which are not part of the statutory definition, need not constitution-
ally be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; indeed the burden of proof 
for these affirmative or special defenses may constitutionally be 
placed on the defense.9 Within the armed forces, however, the Man-
ual for Courts-Martial1° declares: 
The burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused 
beyond a reasonable doubt is upon the Government, both 
with respect to those elements of the offense which must be 
established in every case and with respect to issues involv-
ing special defenses which are raised by the evidence.11 
The burden of proof, sometimes referred to as the burden of per-
suasion, must be distinguished from the burden of production, some-
times referred to as the burden of going forward. The party with the 
burden of production has the burden of producing evidence suffi-
cient to raise the issue. This burden may be distinct from the burden 
of proof. As already indicated, the Manual for Courts-Martial, for 
example, places the burden of production for affirmative or special 
defenses primarily on the defense,12 but, once such a defense is 
raised, palces the burden of disproving such a defense on the 
government beyond a reasonable doubt. Within the military context, 
the difference between the burdens of proof and production can be of 
particular importance because the Manual for Courts-Martial 
appears to restrict the government from placing the burden of proof 
on the defense.13 No such limitation exists with respect to the burden 
of production and, consequently, the defense may lawfully be 
required to assert, for example, exceptions to criminality recognized 
in punitive regulations. Thus, in United States v. Cuffee, 14 the Court 
of Military Appeals held that, when a regulation prohibited posses-
sion of a hypodermic syringe with a hypodermic needle unless pos-
9Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (defendant could be required to prove 
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt). 
10Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Rev. ed.) [hereinafter cited as 
MCM, 1969]. 
11MCM, 1969, para. 214. 
12/d. The Manual actually places the burden of proof to negate the defense on the 
government whenever the defense is "raised by the evidence". Thus, the government's 
evidence may itself raise a special defense. 
13As an executive order, the Manual is, of course, subject to revision. Its primary 
effect at present, given the nature of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. 
§§ 801-940 [hereinafter cited as U.C.M.J.] is to prohibit the armed forces from creat-
ing punitive regulations under U.C.M.J., art 92 which place the burden of proof on the 
defense. 
HlQ M.J. 381 (C.M.A. 1981) (clarifying United States v. Verdi, 5 M.J. 330 (C.M.A. 
1980)). See also United States v. Lavine, 13 M.J. 150 (C.M.A. 1982). 
5 
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sessed in the course of "official duty or pursuant to valid prescrip-
tion", the defense had the burden of production in that it had to raise 
the exceptions via evidence.15 Once raised, the burden of proof or 
persuasion shifts to the government which must disprove the claim 
to the exception beyond a reasonable doubt. This division of respon-
sibility, which the court explicitly held constitutional,16 appears 
clearly appropriate in that it is difficult if not impossible for the 
government to negate all possibilities of an exception while such 
information is peculiarly in the possession of the defense. However, 
once the issue is joined and specific, there is no reason not to put the 
government to its burden. The result of this allocation of burdens is to 
require the defense in such a case to obtain and present evidence 
sufficient to raise the issue.I7 
II. PROCUREMENT OF EVIDENCE 
A. INGENERAL 
Congress has declared: 
The trial counsel, the defense counsel, and the court-
martial shall have equal opportunity to obtain witnesses 
and other evidence in accordance with such regulations as 
the President may prescribe. Process issued in court-
martial cases to compel witnesses to appear and testify 
and to compel the production of other evidence shall be 
similar to that which courts of the United States having 
criminal jurisdiction may lawfully issue .... 18 
In response, the President has, through the Manual for Courts-
Martial, directed that process be issued by the trial counsel on behalf 
of both the defense and prosecution19 and that defense requests for 
witnesses be submitted to the trial counsel with any disagreements 
between defense and trial counsel about calling the witnesses to be 
resolved by the convening authority. 20 The present system necessari-
1510 M.J. at 381. 
16/d. at 383-84 (citing at 384, Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 518 (1979)). 
17This is not, incidentally, the rule for litigating suppression motions. Under Mil. R. 
Evid. 304 (confessions and admissions), 311 (search and seizure), and 321 (eye-witness 
identification), the defense is required to raise its issues by an offer of proof rather 
than the actual presentation of evidence. See, e.g., Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to 
the Manual for Courts-Martial. Analysis of Rule 304(d)(3), reprinted at MCM, 1969, 
A18-22. 
18U.C.M.J., art. 46. Article 46 implements the accused's Sixth Amendment right to 
compulsory process. United States v. Davison, 4 M.J. 702, 704 (A.C.M.R. 1977). 
t9MCM, 1969, para. 115. 
zoJd. at para. 115a. 
6 
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ly raises two distinct questions: when will the trial counsel attempt to 
obtain evidence, and what means are available to the trial counsel to 
do so. 
B. THE DECISION TO OBTAIN EVIDENCE 
1. In general 
a. General procedures 
Insofar as witnesses are concerned,21 the Manual for Court-
Martial states: 
The trial counsel will take timely and appropriate 
action to provide for the attendance of those witnesses who 
have personal know ledge of the facts at issue in the case for 
both the prosecution and the defense. He will not of his own 
motion take that action with respect to a witness for the 
prosecution unless satisfied that the testimony of the wit-
ness is material and necessary .... The trial counsel will 
take similar action with respect to all witnesses requested 
by the defense, except that when there is disagreement 
between the trial counsel and the defense counsel as to 
whether the testimony of a witness so requested would be 
necessary, the matter will be referred for decision to the 
convening authority or to the military judge or the presi-
dent of a special court-martial without a military judge 
according to whether the question arises before or after 
the trial begins. A request for the personal appearance of a 
witness will be submitted in writing, together with a 
statement, signed by the counsel requesting the witness, 
containing (1) a synopsis of the testimony that it is 
expected the witness will give, (2) full reasons which 
necessitate the personal appearance of the witness, and (3) 
any other matter showing that the expected testimony is 
necessary to the ends of justice .... The decision on request 
21Documentary and other evidence is not fully dealt with in the Manual for Courts-
Martial. MCM, 1969, para. 115c deals with documentary and other evidence in control 
of military authorities and states that: 
If documents or other evidentiary materials are in the custody and 
control of military authorities, the trial counsel, the convening authority, 
the military judge, or the president of a special court-martial without a 
military judge will, upon reasonable request and without the necessity of 
further process, take necessary action to effect their production for use in 
evidence and, within any applicable limitations (see ... (Military Rules of 
Evidence)), to make them available to the defense to examine or to use, as 
appropriate under the circumstances. 
7 
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for a witness on the merits must be made on an individual 
basis in each case by weighing the materiality of the tes-
timony and its relevance to the guilt or innocence of the 
parties concerned, against the equities of the situation .... 
If the convening authority determines that the witness 
will not be required to attend the trial, the request may be 
renewed at the trial for determination by the military 
judge or the president of a special court-martial without a 
military judge, as if the question arose for the first time 
during the trial. 
The trial counsel may consent to admit the facts expected 
from the testimony of a witness requested by the defense if 
the prosecution does not contest these facts or if they were 
unimportant .... 22 
Under paragraph 115, the individual trial counsel's decision to 
obtain a witness is not subject to review. In actual practice, the 
prosecution's decision is subject to the review of the trial counsel's 
superiors, usually the staff judge advocate and convening authority, 
who may direct the trial counsel not to subpoena or otherwise obtain 
a witness for a variety of reasons,23 including financial ones. The 
defense attempt to obtain witnesses is, however, subject to definite 
review. Although, pragmatically, the defense may obtain its own 
witnesses and call them at trial, it lacks the power to subpoena them 
or to pay witness fees or travel costs unless it complies with para-
graph 115. Consequently, if the defense desires to escape the con-
straints of paragraph 115, it is in practice limited in most cases to 
local volunteer witnesses. Even then, a failure to comply with para-
graph 115 means that the trial counsel is legally blameless if the 
witness fails to appear, depriving the defense of a potentially useful 
weapon at trial. 24 
22See text accompanying notes 101-12 infra; MCM, 1969, para. 115a. 
23Such reasons could include a desire not to interfere with the activities of the 
witness, particularly likely when the witness is a highly placed civilian or military 
officer, a possibility of revealing classified information, or simply a desire to avoid 
delaying the trial. 
24In a highly unusual case, the defense might be able to show it that it has a 
substantial interest outweighing the government's interest in knowing the identity of 
the defense witnesses. Under these circumstances, the defense should make an ex 
parte application to the military judge with the record of the application remaining 
sealed until trial. 
If the prosecution has failed to obtain a defense witness without cause, the military 
judge may take corrective action to include granting a continuance or giving special 
instructions to the members. Cj. United States v. Kilby, 3 M.J. 938, 944-45 (N.C.M.R. 
1977). Such a result is less likely if the defense fails to comply with paragraph 115. 
8 
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Subject to the potential availability of extraordinary relief,25 the 
decision of the military judge as to the materiality and procurement 
of a witness is not subject to interlocutory review. The Court of 
Military Appeals has held that "once materiality has been shown the 
Government must either produce the witness or abate the proceed-
ings."26 Thus, military operations, expense, or inconvenience can 
only delay the trial rather than justifying proceeding without an 
otherwise material witness.27 A witness who cannot be located, how-
ever, obviously cannot be produced and trial need not be affected. If 
the witness will be unavailable for an indefinite period, presumably 
the same result would apply if the absence was not due to action by 
the government. 
b. Expert witnesses 
Because many trials are dependent upon the use of expert testim-
ony, procurement of expert witnesses may clearly critical to a case. 
Consequently, expert witnesses are treated specially in the Manual. 
Presumably, because of availability and lack of cost,28 most counsel, 
defense or prosecution, utilize government-employed experts. The 
Manual for Courts-Martial does contemplate, however, the possible 
employment of other experts: 
The provisions of this paragraph are applicabfe unless other-
wise prescribed by regulations of the Secretary of a Depart-
ment. When the employment of an expert is necessary 
during a trial by court-martial, the trial counsel, in 
advance of the employment, will, on the order or permis-
sion of the military judge or the president of a special 
court-martial without a military judge, request the con-
vening authority to authorize the employment and to fix 
the limit of compensation to be paid the expert. The 
request should, if practicable, state the compensation that 
is recommended by the prosecution and the defense. 
U.Cj. Dettinger v. United States, 7 M.J. 216 (C.M.A. 1979). 
26United States v. Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384, 385-86 (C.M.A. 1976). Accord United 
States v. WiiJis, 3 M.J. 94 (C. M.A. 1977). The quoted language has been disclaimed by 
Judge Cook as being overbroad. Id. at 96-100 (Cook, J., dissenting). 
The court has, however, held that there is no right to cumulative evidence. United 
States v. WiiJiams, 3 M.J. 239, 243 (C. M.A. 1977). See generally text accompanying 
notes 59-65 infra. 
27In limited circumstances substitutes for live testimony, such as stipulations, may 
be acceptable. See generally text accompanying notes 66-79 infra. 
28The prosecution will be concerned with expenditure of government funds while 
the defense wiiJ be limited to the funds available to the accused unless the government 
can be required to pay an expert's fee under MCM, 1969, para. 116. 
9 
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When, in advance of trial, the prosecution or the defense 
knows that the employment of an expert will be necessary, 
application should be made to the convening authority for 
permission to employ the expert, stating the necessity 
therefor and the probable cost. In the absence of a previous 
authorization, only ordinary witness fees may be paid for 
the employment of a person as an expert witness.29 
These requirements are in addition to the showing required by para-
graph graph 115 of the Manual. Requests for employment of experts 
under paragraph 116 of the Manual are rarely successful3° and the 
denial of any specific request may raise significant questions of the 
rights to compulsory process and fair trial under the Constitution.31 
It is important to note, however, that nothing in the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice or the Manual of Courts-Martial requires payment 
of special fees to obtain the testimony of an expert who happens to be 
a witness. Thus, a medical doctor who has previously treated the 
accused could be subpoenaed and paid normal witness fees if he or 
she were to be questioned about that treatment. The Manual would 
appear to require some form of expert fee if the expert were to be 
asked to make special preparations for testimony.32 
2. Form of the Paragraph 115 request 
The Manual for Courts-Martial requires that a request for a 
defense witness be in writing and contain a synopsis of the expected 
testimony, justification for the personal appearance of the witness, 
and any other matter showing that the witness is "necessary to the 
ends of justice."33 The request must ordinarily set forth enough 
information to establish the "materiality"34 of the expected testimony 
29/d. The fees authorized are dependent upon service regulations. In the Navy, for 
example: "The convening authority ... will fix the limit of compensation ... on the 
basis of the normal compensation paid by United States attorneys for attendance of a 
witness of such standing in the United States courts in the area involved." Navy 
JAGMAN § 0138k(1). 
30See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 22 C.M.A. 424, 47 C.M.R. 402, 404-06 (1973) 
(holding that the defense failed to demonstrate necessity for employment of a civilian 
psychiatrist). 
31See text accompanying notes 229-377 infra. 
32MCM, 1969, para. 116 speaks of "employment of an expert". Accordingly, requir-
ing the expert to perform tests in advance of trial or to make substantial pretrial 
preparation would seem to require an expert fee. Similarly, obtaining an expert's 
testimony solely to utilize the expert's opinion would seem to constitute "employment''. 
33MCM, 1969, para. 115a. 
34See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. 461,469 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. 
Lucas, 5 M.J. 167, 172 (C.M.A. 1978). 
10 
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of the witness.35 In certain circumstances, however, the government 
will be held responsible for knowledge within its possession so that 
an otherwise deficient paragraph 115 request will be held suffi-
cient. 36 Paragraph 115 necessarily presumes that the defense will be 
able to adequate interview37 the witness in order to set forth an 
adequate synopsis and the courts may be expected to be particularly 
hostile to a witness request made without any contact with the given 
witness.3s Chief Judge Everett has recognized that, in some cases, 
such as those in which the witness is a hostile one, the synopsis 
requirement cannot be met and "a rigid application of these 
requirements would produce a conflict with an accused's statutory 
and constitutional right to compulsory process."39 Consequently, 
when defense counsel cannot contact a witness who is believed to 
have material testimony, that fact should be set forth with an expla-
nation.40 When a defense request for a witness is heard by the mil-
itary judge, the judge must determine the issue "on the basis of the 
35The procedure is recounted in numerous cases. E.g., United States v. Jovan, 3 M.J. 
136 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Iturralde-Aponte, 1 M.J. 196 (C.M.A. 1975); 
United States v. Manos, 17 C.M.A.10, 16-17, 37 C.M.R. 274, 280-81 (1967)(Quinn, C.J., 
concurring in part, dissenting part) (request should include synopsis of expected 
testimony, logical and legal relevance of evidence); United States v. Powell, 4 M.J. 551 
(A.F.C.M.R. 1977); United States v. Courts, 4 M.J. 518 (C.G.C.M.R.1977), aff'd, 9 M.J. 
285 (C. M.A. 1980); United States v. Green, 2 M.J. 823 (A.C.M.R. 1976); United States 
v. Corley, 1 M.J. 584 (A.C.M.R. 1975). A diminished standard of materiality appears to 
apply to experts who have prepared government laboratory reports offered against 
the accused at trial. United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69 (C.M.A. 1980). 
36E.g., United States v. Lucas, 5 M.J. 167, 172 (C. M.A. 1978) (staff judge advocate 
charged with knowledge of the content of a pretrial statement made by the witness at 
the pretrial investigation). 
37Chief Judge Everett appears to believe that some form of contact is generally 
necessary, but that that contact need not be an in person interview. United States v. 
Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 78 (C.M.A. 1980) (Evertt, C.J., concurring in the result). The 
drafters of the Military Rules of Evidence, on the other hand, concluded that the 
defense counsel must be afforded the right to an in person interview of potential 
witnesses before counsel could be required to raise a suppression motion with specific-
ity. Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, Analysis of 
Rule 304(d)(3), reprinted at MCM, 1969, A18-21. Inasmuch as the procurement of a 
witness on the merits may be more essential to due process than the procurement of a 
witness for a suppression motion, the Military Rules of Evidence necessarily suggest 
that the defense be afforded the right to an in person interview before a request for a 
witness under paragraph 115 can be held insufficiently justified. 
assee, e.g., United States v. Corley, 1 M.J. 584, 586 (A.C.M.R. 1975) (counsel's 
representations that two witnesses would give alibi testimony held insufficient when 
"not corroborated or verified in any way"); United States v. Carey, 1 M.J. 761,766-67 
(A.F.C.M.R. 1975). 
39United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77 (C. M.A. 1980) (Everett, C.J., concurring in 
the result). 
4°C/. United States v. Carey, 1 M.J. 761, 767 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975). 
11 
HeinOnline  -- 101 Mil. L. Rev. 12 1983
MILITARY LAW REVIEW [VOL.lOl 
matters presented to the judge ... not just that contained in the writ-
ten request. 41 
3. Timeliness 
The Manual for Courts-Martial does not prescribe time require-
ments for filing a request for witnesses under paragraph 115 and the 
courts have been surprisingly loathe to hold requests invalid as 
untimely. Members of the Court of Military Appeals have clearly 
indicated their willingness to consider the timeliness of a defense 
request42 and the Courts of Military Review have utilized untimeli-
ness in holding that the defense lacked a right to witnesses.43 How-
ever, as of yet, the courts have failed to give any significant guidance 
as to what actually constitutes timeliness. The Courts of Military 
Appeals has stated in dicta, however, that "while a defense counsel, 
for tactical reasons, may properly delay a request for witnesses until 
after the charges are referred to trial, he thereby assumes the risk 
that ... in the interval the witness may become unavailable to testify 
at trial."44 Thus, by awaiting referral of charges, counsel may not 
have an untimely submission but may be unable to obtain the 
requested witness. An unnecessary delay in filing a request risks 
having the request treated as untimely, especially when the delay 
results in the transfer of a witness known to the defense to be pending 
reassignment.45 In most cases, given the brevity of most courts-
martial, a request for the procurement of a witness made at trial, 
41United States v. Corley, 1 M.J. 584, 586 (A.C.M.R. 1975) (citing United States v. 
Jones, 21 C.M.A. 215, 44 C.M.R. 269 (1972)). See United States v. Courts, 4 M.J. 518, 
525-26 (C.G.C.M.R. 1977) (Lynch, Jr., concurring in part, dissenting in part); United 
States v. Green, 2 M.J. 823,826 (A.C.M.R. 1976). Jones, however, does not necessarily 
stand for this proposition since the court in Jones determined the propriety of the trial 
judge's ruling on the basis of all the information given to the judge because he 
"presumably ... considered it in his ruling." 21 C.M.A. at 217, 44 C.M.R. at 271. 
42See, e.g., United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 72, 78 (C.M.A. 1980) (Cook, J. and 
Everett, C.J., individually concurring in the result with separate opinions); United 
States v. Stocker, 7 M.J. 373, 374 (C.M.A. 1979) (summary disposition) (Cook, J., 
dissenting on the grounds that defense request for witness was untimely). 
43See, e.g., United States v. Onstad, 4 M.J. 661, 664 (A.C.M.R. 1977) (dicta). A theory 
of waiver may be applicable. Cf. United States v. Briers, 7 M.J. 776 (A.C.M.R. 1979) 
(failure to request lab analyst when judge gave defense right to do so constitutes 
waiver); United States v. Mackey, 7 M.J. 649, 654 (A.C.M.R. 1979) (same). 
44United States v. Cottle, 14 M.J. 260, 263 (C.M.A. 1982). The lack of a pretrial 
request is not conclusive. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 3 M.J. 772, 773 (A.C.M.R. 
1977); United States v. Phillippy, 2 M.J. 297, 300 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976). 
45E.g., United States v. Onstad, 4 M.J. 661, 664 (A.C.M.R. 1977) (dicta) (overseas 
witness). See also United States v. Credit, 2 M.J. 631, 646 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976), rev'd on 
other grounds, 4 M.J .118 (C. M.A. 1977), affd on remand, 6 M.J. 719 (A.F.C.M.R.1978), 
affd, 8 M.J. 190 (C. M.A. 1980) (defense request reviewed during trial implicitly held 
to be untimely when request had been withdrawn and lab technician discharged in 
interim). 
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untimely or otherwise, effectively constitutes a motion for a continu-
ance. When the request is untimely, the decision is discretionary 
with the military judge. 46 Nonetheless, if the defense shows that the 
witness is material and necessary, the judge should, in the interests 
of justice, grant the request. 47 To do otherwise would penalize the 
accused the for counsel's conduct and would raise a strong probabil-
ity of ultimate reversal for inadequacy of counsel. 
#. Materiality 
The Manual for Courts-Martial requires that a defense request for 
a witness give "full reasons which necessitate the personal appear-
ance of the witness, and ... any other matter showing that the 
expected testimony is necessary to the ends of justice."48 Perhaps, 
because the prosecution is not to procure a prosecution witness on its 
own motion unless "satisfied that the testimony of the witness is 
material and necessary,"49 the courts have consistently viewed para-
graph 115 as requiring that the defense demonstrate the "material-
ity" of its requested witnesses. 5° The exact meaning of "materiality" 
has been unclear. In its evidentiary sense, "materiality" requires at 
least that the evidence involved be relevant. 51 It also may mean in any 
46See, e.g., United States v. Stocker, 7 M.J. 373,374 (C.M.A.1979) (summary disposi-
tion) (Cook, J., dissenting). 
•~see, e.g., United States v. Jovan, 3 M.J. 136, 137 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. 
Green, 2 M.J. 823, 826 (A.C.M.R. 1976); United States v. Onstad, 4 M.J. 661, 664 
(A.C.M.R. 1977). 
4SMCM, 1969, para. 115a. 
49[d. 
50 See, e.g., United States v. Hampton, 7 M.J. 284, 285 (C.M.A.1979); United States v. 
Wagner, 5 M.J. 461 (C. M.A. 1978); United States v. Lucas, 5 M.J. 167 (C. M.A. 1978); 
United States v. Iturralde-Aponte, 1 M.J. 196 (C.M.A. 1975); United States v. Mar-
shall, 3 M.J. 1047 (A.F .C.M.R. 177). Cf. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 31 Crim. 
L. Rep [BNA] 3162 (U.S. July 2, 1982) (noting, however at note 9, that the Court 
expressed "no opinion on the showing which a criminal defendant must make in order 
to obtain compulsory process for securing the attendance ... of witnesses within the 
United States."). 
51See, e.g., United States v. Courts, 4 M.J. 518, 522-23 (C.G.C.M.R. 1977). Mil. R. 
Evid. 401 defines what is often termed, "logical relevance" or the requirement that the 
evidence involved have a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of 
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it 
would be without the evidence.'' Phrased differently, in the case of determining 
witness availability, the evidence must tend to negate the prosecution's case or to 
support the defense's. United States v. Iturralde-Aponte, 1 M.J. 196, 197-98 (C.M.A. 
1975). "Relevance" has additional scope, however, inasmuch as evidentiary rules 
which exclude evidence because of doubt of its probative value, prejudicial impact on 
the members, or for other reasons for social policy are often termed rules of "legal 
relevance". See, e.g. I. Imwinkelried, P. Giannelli, F. Gilligan & F. Lederer, Criminal 
Evidence 62-65 (1979). Mil. R. Evid. 403-05; 407-12 are rules of legal relevance as are 
the rules of privilege, Mil. R. Evid. 501-09, and testimony which would be inadmissible 
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given case that, considering all of the factors unique to the case, 52 the 
evidence is important,53 a determination which might include the 
availability of substitute forms of evidence. 54 Recently, the Court of 
Military Appeals has attempted to clarify the issue: 
The word "material" appears misused. Obviously a wit-
ness' testimony must be material to be admissible .... 
However, the terms may have been confused in earlier 
cases, the true test is essentiality. If a witness is essential 
for the presentation of the prosecution's case, he will be 
present or the case will fail. The defense has a similar 
right. 55 
The use of the word, "essential", can hardly be considered as resolv-
ing this question for the term is itself subject to ambiguity. What 
degree of probative value is necessary before a prospective witness' 
testimony will be "essential"? In past cases, witnesses needed to 
establish affirmative defenses such as lack of jurisdiction or self-
defense have usually been considered to be material witnesses56 as 
under them should not ordinarily be "material" for purposes of obtaining witnesses. 
But see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); text accompanying notes 341-72, 
373-77 infra-. 
52United States v. Tangpuz, 5 M.J. 426, 429 (C.M.A. 1978). 
53 At common law, "materiality" had been given two alternative meanings: that the 
evidence is of consequence to the case and that the evidence is of particular probative 
value. The paragraph 115 standard includes this latter meaning. See note 55 infra. 
54 A true materiality standard should not include this factor. To the extent that it 
plays a role in the question of making a witness available, see text accompanying notes 
66-79 infra, it is because of the phrasing of paragraph 115a, which does not as such 
specify "materiality" as the prerequisite for obtaining a witness. 
55United States v. Bennett, 12 M.J. 463,465 n.4 (C.M.A. 1982). In the past, the court, 
in determining whether a failure to obtain a requested defense witness necessitated 
reversal, stated: "materiality ... must embrace the 'reasonable likelihood' that the 
vidence could have affected the judgment of the military judge or court members." 
United States v. Hampton, 7 M.J. 284, 285 (C.M.A. 1979) (citing Giglio v. United 
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); United States v. Lucas, 5 M.J. 167, 172-73 (C.M.A. 
1978)); United States v. Tippit, 7 M.J. 908 (A.F.C.M.R.1979). See Compulsory Process 
II, infra note 382, at 222-23 & n.108. 
56See, e.g., United States v. Hampton, 7 M.J. 284 (C. M.A. 1979) (lack of jurisdiction; 
witness immaterial when defense counsel had not interviewed him); United States v. 
Iturralde-Aponte, 1 M.J. 196 (C.M.A. 1975) (self-defense); United States v. Dawkins, 
10 M.J. 620 (A.F .C.M.R. 1980) (insanity defense; witness immaterial when psychiatric 
interview with defendant needed and witness does not interview defendant); United 
States v. Jones, 6 M.J. 770 (A.C.M.R. 1978) (insanity defense; witness immaterial 
when no indication they would retract earlier sanity board opinions); United States v. 
Christian, 6 M.J. 624 (A.C.M.R. 1978) (suppression motion; witness immaterial if no 
adequate showing that witness remembered incident); United States v. Krejce, 5 M.J. 
701 (N.C.M.R. 1978) (lack of jurisdiction); United States v. Onstad, 4 M.J. 661 
(A.C.M.R. 1977) (informant's perjury at Art. 32 investigation, but inadequate showing 
of materiality on facts); United States v. Green, 2 M.J. 823 (A.C.M.R. 1976( (alibi); 
United States v. Staton, 48 C.M.R. 250 (A.C.M.R. 1974) (no intent to desert); United 
States v. Snead, 45 C.M.R. 382 (A.C.M.R. 1972) (entrapment). 
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have been defense character witnesses57 when the accused's charac-
ter has been in issue. 58 While these cases may deal with "essential" 
evidence, it is unlikely that the defense could or should be restricted 
to witnesses. presenting evidence of such ultimately critical value. 
Interestingly, in the May, 1983, Proposed Revision of the Manual for 
Courts-Martial, the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice has, 
in proposed Rule 703(b)(l), created a potentially more useful stand-
ard: "Each party is entitled to the production of any witness whose 
testimony on a matter in issue on the merits or an interlocutory 
question would be relevant and necessary." The Discussion to the 
proposed rule states: "Relevant testimony is necessary when it is not 
cumulative and when it would contribute to a party's presentation of 
the case in some positive way on a matter in issue." The proposed 
Rule is qualified in Rule 703(b)(3), which provides that, notwith-
standing Rule 703(b)(l), a party is not entitled to production of a 
witness who would be unavailable under Military Rule of Evidence 
804(a) unless the witness' testimony "is of such central importance to 
an issue that it is essential to a fair trial ... ".The Rule's caveat is not 
likely to be of importance except insofar as it incorporates, through 
Military Rule of Evidence 804(a)(6), Article 49(d)(2) of the Uniform 
Code which, in relevant part, makes a witness unavailable "by reason 
of. .. military necessity, ... or other reasonable· cause." Unless this 
exception is utilized in an improbably broad fashion, the proposed 
Rule appears both more useful and more likely to comply with an 
accused's constitutional and statutory rights to obtain and present 
evidence than does the court's "essentiality" standard. 
5. Cumulative testimony 
Inherent in the right to compulsory process is the limitation of 
relevancy.59 Military Rule of Evidence 403 allows evidence to be 
57United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239 (C.M.A.1977); United States v. Carpenter, 1 
M.J. 384 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v. Giermek, 3 M.J. 1013 (C.G.C.M.R. 1977); 
United States v. Ambalada, 1 M.J. 1132 (N.C.M.R. 1977). See generally Mil. R. Evid. 
404(a)(l), 405(a), (b). When the defendant's character for truthfulness is in issue, 
polygraph evidence may be material. Because such evidence has traditionally been 
viewed as being logically and legally irrelevant, however, no compulsory process right 
to introduce such evidence has been recognized. United States v. Helton, 10 M.J. 820 
(A.F.C.M.R. 1981). A witness who is more credible and articulate is material even 
though another witness has already testified to the events. United States v. Jovan, 3 
M.J.136 (C.M.A. 1977). 
58Mil. R. Evid. 404(a) strictly limits use of character evidence restricting it in most 
cases to "[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of the character of the accused .... " Mil. R. 
Evid. 404(a)(l). The Analysis of Rule 404 declares that the Rule makes evidence of 
good general character inadmissible although it would allow "evidence of good mil-
itary character when that specific trait is pertinent ... for example in a prosecution for 
disobedience of orders." Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-
Martial, Analysis of Rule 404(a), reprinted at MCM, 1969, Al8·61. 
s9See note 51 supra. 
15 
HeinOnline  -- 101 Mil. L. Rev. 16 1983
MILITARY LAW REVIEW [VOL.lOl 
excluded, even if logically relevant, 60 "if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed ... by considerations ... of needless presenta-
tion of cumulative evidence." If evidence is cumulative under Rule 
403, it is "legally irrelevant" and there is no right to introduce it. 61 
The issue of cumulative testimony often arises when character 
evidence is sought to be introduced.62 To establish an adequate 
record for appeal, the defense should furnish to the judge the name 
and location of each character witness, how long each witness has 
known the defendant, the capacity in which the witness knew the 
defendant, and the characteristics to which the witness will testify. 63 
The standard used in determining cumulativeness is not merely 
whether the evidence is repetitive. Instead, the military judge must 
"in his sound discretion decide whether, under the circumstances of 
the given case, there is anything to be gained from an additional 
witness saying the same thing other witnesses have said ... ".64 If 
testimony is declared to be cumulative, the judge should indicate 
how many of such witnesses will be subpoenaed at government 
expense. Only the defense, though, can decide which witnesses will be 
called to testify.6s 
6. Alternatives to personal attendance at trial of a witness 
The Court of Military Appeals has stated that, even though a 
witness is material, personal attendance at trial may be obviated by 
other effective alternatives, 66 including depositions, interrogatories, 
60Jd. 
61United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239, 242 (C.M.A. 1977). See United States v. 
Staton, 48 C.M.R. 251, 254 (A.C.M.R. 197 4); Mil. R. Evid. 402. See note 51 supra for the 
definition of "legal relevance." Clearly irrelevant evidence cannot be considered 
"essential" evidence under United States v. Bennett, 112 M.J. 463, 465 n.4 (C.M.A. 
1982). 
62E.g., United States v. Credit, 8 M.J.190 (C.M.A.l980); United States v. Tangpuz, 5 
M.J. 426 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239 (C.M.A. 1977); United 
States v. Courts, 4 M.J. 518 (C.G.C.M.R. 1977), affd, 9 M.J. 285 (C. M.A. 1980); United 
States v. Elliott, 3 M.J. 1080 (A.C.M.R. 1977); United States v. Scott, 3 M.J. 1111 
(N.C.M.R. 1977). Note that paragraph 115 of the Manual for Courts-Martial was 
amended in 1981 so as to generally eliminate live witness testimony on sentencing. 
63See United States v. Manos, 17 C.M.A. 10, 16-17, 37 C.M.R. 274, 280-81 (C.M.A. 
1967) (Quinn, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); text accompanying notes 
18-20 supra. Note that the trial counsel need not be concerned with this procedure as 
the government determines whether to make witnesses available. 
64United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239,243 n.8 (C. M.A. 1977).Accord United States 
v. Scott, 3 M.J. 1111, 1113 (N.C.M.R. 1977). 
65United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239, 243 n.9 (C.M.A. 1977) (Perry, J., Fletcher, 
C.J ., concurring; Cook, J ., dissenting). In an appropriate case, the judge would clearly 
be able to make that determination. However, in the usual situation, the decision is for 
the defense. 
66United States v. Scott, 5 M.J. 431,432 (C. M.A. 1978); United States v. Willis, 3 M.J. 
94, 98 (C.M.A. 1977)(Cook, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Courts, 9 M.J. 285, 
292-93 (C.M.A. 1980). 
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and stipulations to the expected testimony of the witness. 67 If the 
government is willing to stipulate to the witness' expected testimony, 
there may be no need for the witness,6s especially inasmuch as the 
defense may have obtained more through the stipulation than it 
would have through live testimony because the government has lost 
the chance of rebuttal. The decision to admit alternatives lies in the 
discretion of the judge.69 The fundamental issue is whether "the 
effect of the form of the testimony under the particular facts and 
circumstances of the case will ... diminish the fairness of the pro-
ceedings."70 Because the circumstances of each individual case are 
extremely important, the judge should explicitly state reasons for 
allowing alternative forms of testimony to insure adequate review of 
the decision. n 
Older cases allowed the judge to use a balancing test in deciding 
whether to allow alternatives to the witness' personal appearance.72 
However, a presumption existed that the defense request was to be 
granted if it would be "done without manifest injury to the service."73 
with military necessity or convenience often being cited as reasons 
for refusing to require the personal appearance of the witness. 74 The 
Court of Military Appeals, in United States v. Carpenter75 and United 
States v. Willis, 76 has overruled that approach. The current standard 
requires that the witness' personal appearance turn only on the 
materiality of the testimony;77 military necessity only affects when 
the witness can testify.7S Even though obtaining witnesses for the 
61E.g., United States v. Snead, 45 C.M.R. 382,386 (A.C.M.R. 1972) (listing alterna-
tives). See also Proposed Rule of Court-Martial 703(b)(3), Proposed Revision of the 
Manual for Courts-Martial (Joint Service Comm. on Military Justice, May 1983). 
68This may be particularly true of some character witnesses. While character 
evidence given by the defendant's commanding officer "occupies a unique and favored 
position in military judicial proceedings," United States v. Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384,386 
(C.M.A. 1976), performance ratings, fitness reports, and efficiency reports may be 
acceptable substitutes. United States v. Tangpuz, 5 M.J. 426, 430 (C.M.A. 1978). 
69United States v. Scott, 5 M.J. 431, 432 (C.M.A.1978). It should be noted that most of 
the cases in which substitutes for live testimony were urged by the government were 
cases in which the testimony was offered for sentencing purposes by the defense. With 
the revision of the Manual for Courts-Martial to generally eliminate live testimony for 
sentencing, see MCM, 1969, para. 75, the number of appellate cases involving a use of 
substitutes for live testimony should diminish. 
70United States v. Scott, 5 M.J. 431, 432 (C.M.A.1978). Thus, if a witness' credibility 
is important, live testimony should be required. 
71 United States v. Scott, 5 M.J. 431,432 (C.M.A. 1978). 
72United States v. Manos, 17 C. M.A. 10, 15, 37 C.M.R. 27 4, 279 (1967); United States 
v. Sweeney, 14 C.M.A. 599, 34 C.M.R. 379 (1964). 
73United States v. Manos, 17 C.M.A. 10, 15, 37 C.M.R. 274,279 (1967). 
14See, e.g., United States v. Sweeney, 14 C.M.A. 599, 606, 34 C.M.R. 379, 386 (1964). 
1s1 M.J. 384 (C.M.A. 1976). 
763 M.J. 94 (C.M.A. 1977). 
77United States v. Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384, 386 (C.M.A. 1976). 
1Sfd. 
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defense may be inconvenient and costly to the government, the 
defendant cannot be compelled to accept a substitute for those rea-
sons alone. 79 
7. Defense objections to Paragraph 115 
Applying as it does to virtually all defense witnesses, paragraph 
115 produces two primary complaints; that the defense must "submit 
its request to a partisan advocate for a determination,"80 and that, in 
doing so, it necessarily reveals defense strategy and testimony to the 
government.81 Inasmuch as the trial counsel is exempt from any 
similar situation, equal protection complaints were also raised. 
a. The recipient of the request 
As a matter of practice, the prosecution's decision to procure a 
witness is subject only to the review of those who have endorsed the 
prosecution of the accused, i.e., the staff judge advocate and conven-
ing authority. 82 Although the law requires these officers to be neutral 
and experience suggests that most make great efforts to carry out 
their legal duty, both common sense and experience suggest that an 
inherent conflict of interest exists when the defense requests that a 
given witness be obtained.83 Any given witness potentially repres-
ents the expenditure of funds84 for a purpose contrary to what may be 
viewed as the best interest of the given officer or service. A number of 
commentators have recognized, for example, that the staff judge 
advocate is in effect the chief prosecutor for the convening author-
ity85 and paragraph 115 asks a great deal of such a person. Further-
79United States v. Willis, 3 M.J. 94, 96 (C.M.A. 1977). 
80United States v. Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384, 386 n.8 (C.M.A. 1976). 
81 Disclosure results not only from notice of who the defense wishes to call, but, more 
importantly, from the requirement that the defense must show materiality in order to 
obtain the witness, a requirement which necessarily reveals defense strategy. See text 
accompanying notes 89-95 infra. 
82In most of the armed forces, the prosecutor is rated by these officers, or their 
equivalents, and promotion is thus contingent on the prosecutor's compliance with 
their wishes. 
83See note 85 infra. 
84Budgeting for courts-martial varies within the armed forces with not all services 
budgeting specifically for trials. When witness expenses come out of a ship's operating 
budget, for example, one can expect the ship's captain who is the convening authority 
to be particularly resistant to any expense. 
sssee, e.g., Hodson, The Manual for Courts-Martial-1984, 57 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 15 
(1972), in which General Hodson, formerly The Judge Advocate General of the Army 
and then Chief Judge of the Army Court of Military Review, said: "I would favor 
recognizing the staff judge advocate and the commander for what they are. They are 
the Government." Indeed, he proposed reorganizing the military criminal legal sys-
tem so that the "staff judge advocates ... would resemble United States Attorneys." I d. 
at8. 
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more, as a matter of law, paragraph 115 declares that the trial 
counsel will take action to provide a witness requested by the defense 
"except when there is disagreement between the trial counsel and 
the defense counsel [as to the necessity for the witness]." In effect, the 
trial counsel has a substantial amount of leverage over the defense. 86 
The Court of Military Appeals has noted this objection to paragraph 
115 and has stated in dicta that "the requirement appears to be 
inconsistent with Article 46 ... ".87 More recently, Chief Judge Eve-
rett appears to have implicitly rejected this view by stating that "the 
Government is entitled to prescribe reasonable rules whereunder it 
will have adequate opportunity either to arrange for the presence of 
the witness or to explore any legally permissible alternative to the 
presence of the witness."8S 
The defense may be able to escape the need to advise the prosecu-
tion of its requested witnesses by directly requesting the witness 
from the military judge. Under present law, this solution would 
appear appropriate only when the defense has a substantial interest 
in not advising the government of the identify of the witnesses, an 
interest which clearly outweighs the government's interest in know-
ing their identity. Inasmuch as this procedure would of necessity 
require the judge to utilize novel procedures to insure that the neces-
sary witness fees could be paid and the subpoena served in the event 
of a noncooperative witness, the most probable circumstance justify-
ing this procedure would be a defense showing that a prosecution 
member would likely tamper with the witness. In such a unique 
circumstance, the military judge should seal the record of the wit-
ness request until the conclusion of the witness's testimony. 
b. Defense disclosure of tactics and strategy 
The defense objection that paragraph 115 necessarily reveals 
defense tactics and strategy can be divided into two components: the 
86The Court of Military Appeals has said that its application of paragraph 115leaves 
"no doubt that an accused's right to secure the attendance of a material witness is free 
from substantive control by trial counsel." United States v. Arias, 3 M.J. 436, 438 
(C.M.A. 1977). But see United States v. Cottle, 14 M.J. 260, 261 (C. M.A. 1982) (trial 
counsel denied the witness request). Trial counsels can and have rejected paragraph 
115 requests as being procedurally deficient, however, using the rejection as a tactical 
ploy to either discourage the defense from requesting the witness or the judge from 
granting the request due to the lateness of the final request or to encourage the defense 
counsel to plea bargain. 
87United States v. Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384, 386 n.8 (C.M.A. 1976). Accord United 
States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239, 240 n.2 (C.M.A. 1977). 
88United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77-78 (C.M.A. 1980). Chief Judge Everett 
concurred in the result of Vietor only, while Judge Fletcher, also concurring in the 
result alone, found Judge Everett's "analysis ... unacceptable." !d. at 78. 
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disclosure itself and the lack of reciprocity. Proper compliance with 
paragraph 115 will result in a disclosure to the government of all 
defense witnesses and a synopsis of their individual testimony. 
Although counsel may well believe that they are required to disclose 
more than the law actually requires,89 there is no doubt but that the 
quantum actually required, as well as the quantum occassionally 
demanded by prosecutors, is enough to be very revealing. The prose-
cution has no equivalent requirement90 and the broad discovery 
available to the defense as a matter of practice can hardly be equated 
with the template of the defense case required under paragraph 115. 
Any Fifth Amendment objection91 to paragraph 115 appears to be 
foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Florida. 92 
In Williams, the Court sustained Florida's notice of alibi rule against 
constitutional self-incrimination objections on the grounds that the 
defense was only divulging information which it would have to 
reveal at trial.93 Although Williams appears to require a reciprocal 
duty on the party of the government,94 that requirement is met 
simply by making discovery of the prosecution case available to the 
defense;95 response in kind is not apparently required. 
c. Lack of reciprocity in general 
Defense counsel have contended that paragraph 115 "improperly 
discriminates against an accused because it imposes burdens in the 
procurement of a defense witness that are not imposed upon the 
Government."96 In effect, this is a claimed violation of Article 46 and 
a denial of equal protection. Chief Judge Everett may have addressed 
89See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 8 M.J. 858, 865 (N.C.M.R. 1980). 
90Although the charge sheet, MCM, 1969, App. 5, requires the names and addresses 
of witness for both the defense and prosecution, that requirement is more honored in 
the breach. Further, a command's information as to possible witnesses is something 
far different from counsel's actual intent at trial. 
91Although the Supreme Court's decisions may resolve the Fifth Amendment ques-
tion, they leave untouched the parallel Article 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1976), the military's 
statutory right against self-incrimination, question. 
92399 u.s. 78 (1970). 
93The view has been, in effect, that the information gained by the prosecution is de 
minimis and serves the interests of justice and judicial efficiency by avoiding sur-
prise. See generally Van Kessel, Prosecutorial Discovery and the Privilege Against 
Self-Incrimination: Accommodation or Capitulation, 4 Hasting Const. L.Q. 855, 882-
89 (1977). Inasmuch as the information obtained from the defense may lead the 
government to evidence otherwise undiscoverable, at least until the defense portion of 
the case, it can hardly be said that the defense material is de minimis. Rather, it may 
practically assist the government greatly in making out its case in chief. 
94Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973). 
95ld. See also United States v. Dixon, 8 M.J. 858, 865 (N.C.M.R. 1980) (discovery 
afforded defense via Article 32 proceedings more than balances government's discov-
ery from paragraph 115). 
96United States v. Arias, 3 M.J. 436, 438 (C.M.A. 1977). 
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this when he stated that paragraph 115 not only provides the 
government with an opportunity to explore any permissible alterna-
tive to the witness,97 but also insures that the defense counsel, who 
might be spurred as an advocate to request witnesses in the hope that 
the delay and expense would result in dismissal or an attractive plea 
bargain, have a good faith belief that the testimony will benefit the 
accused.9S The Courts of Military Review have justified paragraph 
115 as permitting the trial court to avoid cumulative testimony99 and 
insuring "that government funds are not wasted in producing wit-
nesses who are not absolutely necessary and material. ... "100 Al-
though these purposes are praiseworthy, the present procedural 
mechanism is not necessary to insure that they are well served. 
8. Revision of Paragraph 115. 
The primary defense objections to paragraph 115 could be met by 
requiring counsel to submit requests to the military judge for resolu-
tion. Although this could be done in an ex parte fashion, thus shield-
ing the defense case from the government, the interests of justice 
would best be served by requiring service of witness requests on the 
opposing party with adversarial litigation before the trial judge. 
This would permit the stipulations and concessions that may hasten 
the process. Further, it would equalize the parties' information and 
permit either side to argue against a given witness request. Such a 
system would moot virtually all of the present objections to para-
graph 115. Opponents would most likely urge that it would remove 
fiscal control from the convening authority and further extend the 
power and number of military judges. As to the former, a revised 
paragraph 115 could leave the government with the option of fund-
ing the witness or dismissing charges, a reasonable, although unpal-
atable, choice. As to the latter point, a fundamental issue is involved 
the resolution of which is dependent on far more than this issue. 
C. THEPOWERTOOBTAINEVIDENCE 
1. Evidence in the custody or control of military authorities 
Although the Proposed Revision of the Manual for Courts-Martial 
provides a comprehensive body of discovery rules, 101 modeled in part 
97United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77-78 (C.M.A. 1980). 
9SJd. at 78. See also United States v. Kilby, 3 M.J. 938, 944-45 (N.C.M.R. 1977). 
99United States v. Dixon, 8 M.J. 858, 865 (N.C.M.R. 1980). 
100United States v. Christian, 6 M.J. 624, 627 (A.C.M.R. 1978) (DeFord J., concur-
ring). Accord United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239 (C. M.A. 1977). 
101Proposed Rule of Courts-Martial 701, Proposed Revision of th~ Manual for 
Courts-Martial (Joint Service Comm. on Military Justice, Department of Defense. 
May 1983) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rules of Courts-Martial]. 
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on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the present Manual for 
Courts-Martial provides little in the way of procedure for obtaining 
evidence in military control, other than the testimony of witnesses, 
when it declares: 
If documents or other evidentiary materials are in the 
custody and control of military authorities, the trial coun-
sel, the convening authority, the military judge ... will, 
upon reasonable request and "without the necessity of 
further process, take necessary action to effect their pro-
duction for use in evidence and ... to make them available 
to the defense to examine or to use, as appropriate under 
the circumstances.1o2 
The Manual clearly contemplates the voluntary cooperation of others 
when a proper officer requests evidentiary materials. It does not 
expressly provide a remedy when efforts at voluntary cooperation 
fail.l03 However, given the defense's constitutional right to compul-
IOZMCM, 1969, para. 115c. 
103The situation should be analyzed from the perspective of the two parties. The 
government is usually viewed in a unitary fashion and, if prosecution cannot obtain 
needed evidence, it may be reasonable to expect it to get its house in order or suffer the 
consequences. Unfortunately, this does place enforcement of the criminal law poten-
tially in the hands of those who may have contrary motives. See, e.g., United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). While great deference should be paid to the government, 
especially within the military with its chain of command, given the potential for 
obstruction, and the occasional bureaucratic obstacles present when evidence must be 
obtained from an unrelated command, the prosecution should not be penalized as a 
general rule for an inability to obtain voluntary cooperation in evidence production. 
When the defense is unable to obtain needed evidence, a different situation results 
because of the accused's constitutional rights to confrontation, compulsory process, 
and fair trial. The question then becomes one of remedy. The law does not guarantee 
an accused the right to a trial to clear his or her name, but see U.C.M.J. art. 4 
(dismissed officer's right to trial by court-martial), and the accused can be protected 
by dismissal of charges or abatement of trial rather than by, an order to obtain needed 
evidence. 
This omission is rectified by Proposed Rule of Court-Martial 701(g)(3), which pro-
vides that: 
[T]he Military judge may take one or more of the following actions: 
(A) Order the party to permit discovery; 
(B) Grant a continuance; 
(C) Prohibit the party from introducing evidence or raising a defense 
not disclosed; and 
(D) Enter such order as is just under the circumstances. 
Although the Rule further provides that it "shall not limit the right of the accused to 
testify in the accused's behalf," its provision permitting the judge to prohibit the 
defense from raising an undisclosed defense raises troubling constitutional questions 
which the Supreme Court expressly chose not to explore in Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78, 83 n.14 (1970). Although the Court declared in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 
470, 472 (1973) that "the Due Process Clause ... forbids enforcement of alibi rules 
unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal defendants", it did not reach 
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sory process, the power to obtain evidence granted by the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice,104 and the express powers granted by the 
Manual to the military judge to call witnesses105 and require addi-
tional evidence, lOG it seems apparent that the power exists in at least 
the military judgel07 to order the production of evidence in military 
custody. In the event of noncompliance with such an order, however, 
the only meaningful sanctions may be to abate the proceedings108 and 
perhaps prefer criminal charges against those refusing to comply.109 
When witnesses are involved, the Manual states that, customarily, 
the attendance of a witness stationed near enough to trial so "that 
travel at government expense will not be involved, will ordinarily be 
obtained by notification, oral or otherwise, by the trial counsel, to the 
person concerned .... In order to assure the attendance of the person, 
the proper commanding officer should be informally advised so that 
he can arrange for the timely presence of the witness."110 The Manual 
continues by stating that if formal notice is required, "the trial 
the question of how, if at all, Oregon's notice of alibi rule could be enforced. 412 U.S. at 
472. n.4. 
104U.C.M.J. art. 46. 
IOSMil. R. Evid. 614(a). 
106MCM, 1969, para. 54b. Paragraph 54b declares in relevant part that: 
The court is not obliged to content itself with the evidence adduced by the 
parties. When that evidence appears to be i;nsufficient for a proper 
determination of the matter before it or when not satisfied that it has 
received all available admissible evidence on an issue before it, the court 
may take appropriate action with a view to obtaining available addi-
tional evidence. 
Paragraph 54b does not explicitly address how the evidence shall be obtained and 
continues to illustrate its point by stating: "The court may, for instance, require the 
trial counsel. .. to summon new witnesses .... " Given the express power to call wit-
nesses granted by Mil. R. Evid. 614(a), however, it is clear that the Manual is not 
relying solely on the voluntary cooperation of military personnel. 
107MCM, 1969, para. 115d(1) authorizes the trial counsel to subpoena civilian wit-
nesses. Although the provision could be read as limiting the trial counsel's power to 
subpoena to civilians, it seems more likely that the Manual's drafters took for granted 
government compliance with paragraph 115c and simply granted express power to 
deal with the case of civilians. However, to the extent that the Manual fails to grant 
subpoena power to compel military production of evidence, it seems clear that the 
Manual necessarily grants such power to the military judge. In United States v. 
Toledo, 15 M.J. 255, 256 (C. M.A. 1983), the court held that the trial judge erred by 
refusing to order the prosecution to obtain a transcript of a prosecution witness' prior 
federal district court testimony for impeachment use. 
108United States v. Willis, 3 M.J. 94 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Carpenter, 1 
M.J. 384 (C.M.A. 1976). See also n.26 supra. 
109 A refusal to supply evidence pursuant to either paragraph 115c or a court order 
may constitute a violation of Articles 98 or 134. Cf. United States v. Perry, 2 M.J.l13, 
116 (C.M.A. 1977) (Fletcher, C.J ., concurring) (violation of speedy trial right); United 
State v. Powell, 2 M.J. 6, 8 (C. M.A. 1976) (unnecessary delay in completing Article 32 
proceedings). Refusal to obey a court order may also constitute a disobedience under 
Articles 90 and 92. 
IIOMCM, 1969, para. 115b. 
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counsel will, through regular channels, request the proper com-
manding officer to order the witness to attend.m Notwithstanding its 
phrasing, the Manual does not appear to intend that the command-
ing officer of the accused has any discretion to reject the request in 
general. The decisions of the Court of Military Appeals treat the 
government in a unitary fashion and when a material defense wit-
ness is not made available, trial must be abated until the witness is 
available.112 The court has implicitly recognized that witnesses may 
not be instantly available and that, in normal practice, reasonable 
needs of the individual or the service are accommodated. 
2. Evidence not in military control 
Although most civilian evidence is obtained through the voluntary 
cooperation of the appropriate individuals, recourse to process is 
occasionally necessary, and Congress has provided that: 
Process issued in court-martial cases to compel witnesses 
to appear and testify and to compel the production of other 
evidence shall be similar to that which courts of the United 
States having criminal jurisdiction may lawfully issue 
and shall run to any part of the United States, or the 
territories, Commonwealths, and possessions.113 
At the outset, it is apparent that process is unavailable if it would 
reach abroad, except for the "territories, Commonwealths, and pos-
sessions,"114 and the Manual states: "In foreign territory, the attend-
ance of civilian witnesses may be obtained in accordance with exist-
ing agreements or, in the absence thereof, within the principles of 
international laws."115 Further, courts-martial lack the power to 
compel the attendance abroad of witnesses who could be compelled to 
attend courts-martial tried within the United States.11G 
lll]d. 
112See note 108 supra. In an appropriate case, dismissal of charges may be necessary. 
uau.C.M.J., art. 46. 
114Presumably, a court-marta! could constitutionally be given the power to sub-
poena United States citizens outside the United States to trials taking place within the 
United States. Civilian federal courts have such power. 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1976); Fed. 
R. Crim. P. 17(e)(2). 
115MCM, 1969, para. 115d(1). The Manual also states that "in occupied enemy 
territory, the appropriate commander is empowered to compel the attendance of a 
civilian witness in response to a subpoena issued by the trial counsel." I d. 
116United States v. Bennett, 12 M.J. 463,471 (C.M.A. 1982) (courts-martial lack the 
statutory power to require a United States citizen to testify abroad before a court-
martial); United States v. Daniels, 23 C.M.A. 94, 96-97, 48 C.M.R. 655, 657-58 (1974) 
(courts-martial lack power to compel testimony of U.S. citizen military dependent 
residing in the same nation in which the court-martial takes place); United States v. 
Potter, 1 M.J. 897, 899 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976) (court-martial could not compel American 
witness to testify in Germany); United States v. Boone, 49 C.M.R. 709, 711 (A.C.M.R. 
1975) (American witness could not be compelled to testify in Germany). 
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Compulsory process is available in two forms: subpoena and war-
rant of attachment. The subpoena compels the attendance of a wit-
ness by the coercion of law while a warrant of attachment results in 
the apprehension of the witness and his or her coerced physical 
transportation to trial. 
a. Subpoenas 
Pursuant to Article 46 ofthe Uniform Code of Military Justice, the 
Manual for Courts-Martial provides for the issuance of subpoenas by 
the trial counsel to compel the attendance of civilian witnesses.117 The 
Manual provides a model subpoena form 118 and states that service 
should generally be made by mail.119 The trial counsel is required to 
"take appropriate action with a view to timely and economical serv-
ice when formal service is necessary.120 According to the Manual, 
personal service "ordinarily will be made by persons subject to mil-
itary law, but may legally be made by others."121 Service by United 
States marshals has occasionally been used in lieu of service by 
military personnel. In the event of noncompliance with the subpoena, 
the witness is subject to criminal prosecution in a United States 
district court under the provisions of Article 4 7 of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice.122 Such a sanction is not particularly useful 
insofar as obtaining the testimony of the witness is concerned. Given 
a witness who refuses to comply, the trial counsel may request a 
United States district court to direct the attendance of the witness or, 
more directly, may issue a warrant of attachment. 
117MCM, 1969, para. 115d(1). Insofar as summary courts-martial are concerned, 
paragraph 79b states that a summary court has the same power as a trial counsel to 
obtain evidence. See also Proposed Rule of Court-Martial 703(e)(2). 
11SMCM, 1969, A17-1. 
119The Manual also states that the witness should ordinarily be advised that volun-
tary compliance with the subpoena will not prejudice the rights of a witness to fees and 
mileage and that a voucher for such fees will be paid after completion of testimony. 
MCM, 1969, para. 115d(1). 
12flJd. 
121Jd. 
122Article 47 penalizes an individual, not subject to court-martial jurisdiction, who 
having been properly subpoenaed "willfully neglects or refuses to appear, or refuses to 
qualify as a witness or to testify or to produce any evidence which that person may 
have been legally subpoenaed to product," U.C.M.J., art. 47(a)(3), and provides a 
maximum punishment of"a fine of not more than $500, or imprisonment for not more 
than six months, or both." I d. at art. 47(b). A prerequisite condition for an Article 47 
prosecution is that the witness has been "duly paid or tendered the fees and mileage of 
a witness at the rates allowed to witnesses attending the courts of the United States." 
!d. at art. 47(a)(2). See also MCM, 1969, para.l15d(2). Interestingly, the Code appears 
to deprive the civilian prosecutor of any prosecutorial discretion as Article 47(c) 
states: "The United States attorney ... shall, upon the certification of the facts to him 
by the military court .•. file an information against and prosecute any person violating 
this article." This is not to say that the prosecution would necessarily comply with 
article 47. See, e.g., C. Lederer, The Military Warrant of Attachment 1 n.6 (1982). 
25 
HeinOnline  -- 101 Mil. L. Rev. 26 1983
MILITARY LAW REVIEW [VOL.lOl 
b. The warrant of attachment1zs 
1. In general 
The warrant of attachment, usually known as a bench warrant in 
civilian practice, directs the seizure of a witness who has refused to 
appear before a court-martial and orders the production of the wit-
ness before the tribunal the process of which has been disobeyed. The 
attachment prerogative has existed almost as long as the power of 
compulsory process124 and may be regarded as inherent to compul-
sory process.125 The express authority of courts-martial to attach 
civilian witnesses first appeared in Army general orders in 1868126 
and, virtually unchanged since that date, was incorporated into the 
modern Manual for Courts-Martial.127 The power to attach is not 
found expressly in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but att-
achment is authorized by the Manual for Courts-Martial, which 
provides: 
In order to compel the appearance of a civilian witness in 
an appropriate case, the trial counsel will consult the con-
vening authority, the military judge, or the president of a 
special court-martial without a military judge, according 
tow hether the question arises before or after the court has 
convened for trial of the case, as to the desirability of 
issuing a warrant of attachment under Article 46. 
When it becomes necessary to issue a warrant of attach-
ment, the trial counsel will prepare it and, when practica-
ble, effect execution through a civil officer of the United 
States. Otherwise, the trial counsel will deliver or send it 
for execution to an officer designated for the purpose by 
the commander of the proper army area, naval district, air 
command, or other appropriate command.128 
123Much of the following text and accompanying footnotes are taken from Lederer, 
Warrants of Attachment-Forcibly Compelling the Attendance of Witnesses, 98 Mil. L. 
Rev. (1983), written by Major Calvin M. Lederer, Instructor, The Judge Advocate 
General's School, U.S. Army. The authors gratefully acknowledge Major Lederer's 
permission to utilize his outstanding article so extensively. Those interested in this 
general topic are urged to read his comprehensive treatment of the topic. 
124See, e.g., 12 Op. Atty. Gen. 501 (1868). 
125See, e.g., Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); United 
States v. Caldwell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 333 (1795). See also 9 Op. Atty. Gen. 266 (1859). 
126General Orders No. 93, Headquarters of the Army (Nov. 9, 1868). See also J. 
Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 202 n.46 (1886, 1920 reprint); Digest of 
Opinions, The Judge Advocate General490 (1880). 
127MCM, 1969, para. 115d(3). 
123Jd. 
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The Manual for Courts-Martial places the full discretion and 
responsibility for issuance of the warrant in the trial counsel, subject 
only to the requirement for consultation with, rather than approved 
by, the appropriate officer. By placing authority in the trial counsel 
to issue the warrant, the Manual obviously contemplates that the 
warrant can only issue after referral of charges.129 The Manual 
authorizes issuance any time thereafter, even before the court actu-
ally convenes. 
The Manual does not state when a warrant of attachment may 
issue. Instead, it provides only that it is to be used in an appropriate 
case.I3o In context, it is clear that a warrant of attachment should be 
used only to obtain a material131 witness who will not comply with a 
subpoena. Although the better practice is to attempt service of a 
subpoena first and to resort to a warrant of attachment only after the 
witness refuses to comply, nothing in the Manual for Courts-Martial 
necessarily suggests that the issuance of a subpoena or an actual 
refusal to appear is a prerequisite to issuance of a warrant. The 
Manual's criterion appears to primarily be one of necessity.132 This 
raises an interesting policy question. In civilian practice, bench 
warrants are generally issued after witnesses fail to appear. Yet, 
civilian courts also utilize material witness statutes to order the 
arrest of witnesses likely to attempt to evade testifying. Although 
bench warrants are utilized for those witnesses who have not 
appeared, while material witness provisions are used for those who 
may not appear, the two procedures are obviously related in that they 
both provide for the procurement and preservation of witness tes-
timony. At present, the armed forces have a bench warrant proce-
dure which might theoretically be utilized as a material witness 
provision. Proposed Rule for Courts-MartiaP33 703(e)(2)(G) and its 
Discussion will condition issuance of the warrant of attachment to 
129A court-martial is convened by the officer designated as a convening authority 
who details the trial counsel (prosecutor) to the court-martial pursuant to U.C.M.J. 
art. 27. The term "convened" in MCM, 1969, para. 115d(3), is somewhat inartful 
because it obviously does not refer to the action ofthe convening authority in creating 
the court but rather to the point at which the court is called into session as there is no 
power to subpoena, much less attach, until there is a court-martial in being for which 
process can issue, it is not until after the court is "convened" and charges in a specific 
case are referred to it that process can issue. 
130/d.. 
131See note 55 and accompanying text supra. 
132MCM, 1969, para. 115d(3), speaks of: "When it becomes necessary to issue a 
warrant of attachment." The civilian case law relating to arrest of material witnesses 
makes it clear that non-compliance with a subpoena is not a condition prerequisite to 
issuance of an arrest warrant. See, e.g., Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 
1971). 
133See note 101 supra. 
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cases in which the witness neglects or refuses to appear. Although 
this may well be desirable both for reasons of policy related to 
military-civilian relations and to forestall raising serious constitu-
tional questions, it should be clear that the proposed revision will 
foreclose a possible avenue for obtaining evidence before courts-
martial. 
Procedurally, the Manual does not prescribe the form of the war-
rantl34 and, although the Manual directs the trial counsel to accom-
pany the warrant with supporting documents, 135 that requirement is 
intended to support the government's position in the event of a 
habeas corpus petition 136 and does not appear to be a formal condition 
to be met before the warrant may issue. 
2. Execution of the warrant 
Execution of the warant is to be effective "when practicable ... 
through a civil officer of the United States."137 The civil officer 
contemplated by the Manual is United States marshal.I38 Failing 
service by a marshal, execution is by a military officer "designated 
for the purpose by the commander of the proper army area, naval 
district, air command, or other appropriate command."139 The Man-
ual contemplates that force may be necessary for the successful 
execution of the warrant,14o although no statute or other executive 
order expressly allows the use of force on or permits the deprivation 
134The Manual prescribes no specific form for the warrant although earlier Manuals 
did so. See, e.g., MCM, 1921 at 655; MCM, 1928 at 88. The present form, DD Form 454, 
is prescribed by the Department of Defense. 
135 
[T]he warrant of attachment will be accompanied by the orders conven-
ing the court-martial, or copies thereof; a copy of the charges in the case, 
including the order referring the charges for trial, each copy certified by 
the trial counsel to be a full and true copy of the original; the original 
subpoena, showing proof of service of a copy thereof; a certificate stating 
that the necessary witness fees and mileage have been duly tendered; and 
an affidavit of the trial counsel that the person being attached is a 
material witness in the case, that the person has willfully neglected or 
refused to appear although sufficient time has elapsed for that purpose, 
and that no valid excuse has been offered for the failure to appear. MCM, 
1969 para. 115d(3). 
13GMCM, 1969, para. 115d(3). 
137/d. 
136U .S. Dep't of Army, Pamphlet No. 27-2, Analysis of Contents Manual for Courts-
Martial, United States 1969, Revised Edition 23-2 (1970). In 1980, the Director of the 
Federal Marshal Service was directed by the Department of Justice to·assist the 
armed forces with the execution of warrants of attachment. 
139MCM, 1969, para. 115d(3). 
140 
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of liberty of a civilian by military authority.141 
3. Constitutionality of the military warrant of attachment 
Clearly, the apprehension by military authorities of a civilian 
witness who is not the subject of criminal charges is troubling and 
raises a number of constitutional questions, among the most impor-
tant of which are the following: 
(1) Whether any innocent citizen may be arrested to obtain 
testimony? 
(2) Whether military authorities may apprehend a civilian to 
obtain testimony at a court-martial? 
{3) What quantum of proof is necessary before a warrant of 
attachment may issue? 
(4) Who may issue a warrant of attachment? 
The first of these questions must be considered resolved; twenty-
seven states expressly utilize variations of the warrant of attach-
ment142 and all states subscribe to the Uniform Act to Secure the 
Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceed-
ings.143 The fundamental concept of the arrest of material witnesses 
is also accepted throughout the American judicial system.144 
Although it could be said that warrants of attachment directing the 
attachment of civilians might better be placed in the hands of civil-
ianjudicial authorities, the only court which has considered the issue 
to date145 has clearly rejected that position.146 The last two questions, 
however, raise issues of substantially greater legal import. 
use of force may be required or when travel or other orders are necessary, 
appropriate application to the proper commander for assistance or for 
orders may be made by the officer who is to execute the process. MCM, 
1969 para. 115d(3). 
141Despite the introduction of several bilis over a' period of years, Congress has 
declined to enact legislation specifically giving military personnel arrest power over 
civilians by statute. The most recent bill ofthis kind was S. 727, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1981) which would have authorized the Secretary of Defense "to invest officers ... of 
the Department of Defense ... with the power to arrest individuals on military facili-
ties and installations." 
t42Lederer, supra note 123, at 12-13, n.49. 
143The Act provides that a host state must honor an order from another state 
directing that a given witness be taken into custody. 
144See note 125 supra. See also Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971). 
145United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1953). 
146The court in Shibley addressed the issue of whether a Marine Court oflnquiry had 
the same power to compel attendance as did a court-martial. In resolving that issue, it 
also addressed the issue of the warrant of attachment as Shibley had been appre-
hended and brought before the court of inquiry. The court stated: 
If the only method of making this provision (authorizing the summoning 
of witnesses) effective were resort to prosecution under (Article 47), the 
result would be ineffective and illusory. Punishment as an offense cannot 
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Although the Supreme Court has held that "a subpoena to appear 
before a grand jury is not a 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment 
sense,"147 it is apparent that the actual apprehension of an individual 
and his or her involuntary physical removal to testify148 at a court-
martial necessarily constitutes such a seizure.149 Except for a limited 
number of exceptions, the Fourth Amendment commands that seiz-
ures be based upon probable cause and at least one court has held 
that a seizure of a material witness must be based upon probable 
cause.150 This conclusion seems correct and fully applicable to the 
military warrant of attachment. What is less clear, however, is what 
probable cause must establish. In the normal attachment case, the 
absence of the subpoenaed witness at trial is apparent and is more 
than enough to support the issuance of a warrant insofar as it is 
necessary to procure that person's attendance.151 Yet, the Manual for 
Courts-Martial contemplates only the attachment of a witness who 
will give "material" testimony.152 Accordingly, it would seem reason-
able to require that the materiality of the witness be demonstrated 
prior to the issuance of the warrant, although it might be argued that 
a subpoena need not be based on probable cause153 and will be consid-
ered valid until properly voided by the court.154 Accordingly, lack of 
compel disclosure to make an inquiry effective. And if boards of inquiry 
are to perform their functions ... , they can do so if only if means exist to 
bring summarily recalcitrant witnesses before them. And the warrant of 
attachment traditionally provides such means. The suggestion has been 
made that only civil courts can compel appearance ... after a civilian 
witness' refusal. ... This remedy, if it existed, would be equally vision-
ary. It would tie the military tribunals to the civil courts contrary to the 
spirit of military law. More, there is notin the (Uniform Code of Military 
Justice) a provision similar to (other statutes unrelated to the military 
which require resort to federal judges to enforce agency subpoenas). Its 
absence indicates that the means to compel attendance must exist in the 
court of inquiry itself. Otherwise, the courts are given the naked power to 
summon, but no power to use a summary method to compel attendance. 
United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734, 743 n.19 (S.D. Cal. 1953). 
147United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973). 
I4Sin order to secure the necessary testimony, the witness may be required to travel 
and may necessarily be held in custody for at least a few days. 
149See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1973) (distinguishing the 
subpoena situation, in which the coercion is the force of law, from detentions of the 
individual affected by the police); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933,942 (9th Cir. 
1971). 
!SOJd. at 943. 
151See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 574 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 1978). 
152See note 131 supra. 
153United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). 
1S4Cj. Dolman v. United States, 439 U.S. 1395, 1395 (1978) (Rehnquist, Circuit 
Justice) ("invalidity of an injunction may not ordinarily be raised as a defense in 
contempt proceedings for its volation"); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 305, 
315-20 (1967); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,293-94 (1947). 
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materiality may only be raised by the prospective witness via a 
motion to quash the subpoena. Although the issue is a close one, as a 
matter of policy, the better course is to demonstrate materiality of 
the witness on a preponderance basis when seeking a warrant of 
attachment. It should be simple for counsel to demonstrate material-
ity in view of the fact that the Manual presently requires the defense 
to demonstrate materiality and the government to only call material 
witnesses155 and because of both the dislocation to the witness and the 
nature of the military intrusion into civil matters caused by the 
warrant. Proof of materiality should clearly be required when a 
warrant is to be issued for an individual who has not been subpoe-
naed. In such a case, the prosecution should demonstrate not only 
materiality but also that the witness is not likely to comply with the 
subpoena.156 
The last matter to be resolved is the question of who should grant 
the warrant of attachment. At present, the Manual specifies that the 
warrant should be issued by the trial counsel.157 The Supreme Court 
has, however, declared search warrants issued by prosecutorsl58 to 
be unconstitutional and declared that issuing officers must be neu-
tral and detached. "Whatever else neutrality and detachment might 
entail, it is clear that they require severance and disengagement 
from activities of law enforcement."159 As warrants of attachment 
result in the seizure of civilians, there is no justification for applica-
tion of the argument of military necessity to their seizure. Although 
placing the warrant of attachment power in the hands of the trial 
counsel is historically understandable in view of the fairly recent 
advent of the military judiciary, 160 there is no justification at present 
for issuing a warrant of attachment by a prosecutor. 
In summary, the present procedure for the issuance of a military 
warrant of attachment provides an unusual tool to secure the testi-
mony of unwilling civilian witnesses. In its present form, however, it 
must be viewed as flawed and almost certainly unconstitutional. 
Given this result, a trial counsel could likely moot any constitutional 
complaints by applying to a military judge for permission to issue a 
155See text accompanying notes 22-27, 48-58 supra. 
156See Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971). 
I57MCM, 1969, para. 115d(3). 
158Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (state attorney general could not 
issue search warrant notwithstanding state statute authorizing him to issue warrants 
as a justice of the peace). 
I59Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972). 
160Military judges were not required at special courts-martial, for example, until 
1969. 
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warrant of attachment, proving in the process on a preponderance 
basis that the desired witness is a material witness and, when 
appropriate, that it is more probable than not that the witness will 
not comply with a subpoena. 
3. Immunity 
a. In general 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a valid claim to the 
privilege against self-incrimination may be overcome by a grant of 
immunity.161 Accordingly, when the prosecution162 seeks the testim-
ony of a witness who will claim the constitutional or statutory163 
privilege, it may compel the individual's testimony through a grant 
of immunity. Although the armed forces have claimed the power to 
grant immunity since at least 1917,164 no statute presently exists165 or 
has ever existed that authorizes the armed forces to grant immunity. 
Dealing with this issue in 1964 in United States v. Kirsch166 the Court 
of Military Appeals held that it perceived "a Congressional grant of 
power to provide immunity from prosecution in the provisions of the 
Uniform Code; and a valid delineation of a method by which to 
exercise the power in the Manual for Courts-Martial ... " 167 In 
Kirsch, the court reasoned that, inasmuch as the Uniform Code 
provides the convening authority the power to overturn a convic-
tion, 168 and thus through the right against double jeopardy the power 
to absolutely protect an accused from criminal sanction, a convening 
authority need not actually try an accused and overturn a conviction 
to grant immunity to a service member.169 The court also noted that 
Congress was well aware of the various Manuals for Courts-Martial 
and regulations providing for immunity and had failed to object to 
161See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Brown v. Walker, 161 
U.S. 591 (1896). See generally, Green, Grants of Immunity of Military Law, 53 Mil. L. 
Rev. 1, 3-16 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Green]. See also Green, Grants of Immunity 
and Military Law 1971-1976, 73 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1976). 
1621nsofar as the ability of the defense to obtain immunity for defense witnesses is 
concerned, see text accompanying notes 392-99 infra. 
163U.C.M.J. art. 31. See generally, Lederer, Rights Warnings in the Armed Services, 
72 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1976). See also Mil. R. Evid. 301-05. 
164Green, supra note 161, at 17 (citing MCM, 1917); Proposed Rule for Courts-
Martial 907(d)(2)(D)(ii). 
165Green, supra note 161, at 17. B1{t see the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 
discussed at note 173 and accompanying text, which has limited application. 
16615 C.M.A. 84, 35 C.M.R. 56 (1964). 
161Id. at 90-91,35 C.M.R. at 62-63. 
168See U.C.M.J. art. 64 ("convening authority may approve only such findings of 
guilty, and the sentence ... as he finds correct in law and fact and as he in his discretion 
determines should be approved.") 
16915 C. M.A. at 92, 35 C.M.R. at 64. 
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the military's interpretation of the law.170 Although expressly recog-
nizing the power of a convening authority to grant immunity, the 
court made it clear that immunity could not be granted for offenses 
over which military courts lackjurisdiction171 and thus, implicitly, a 
convening authority cannot grant immunity to persons not subject to 
trial by court-martial.172 Although Kirsch remains the dispositive 
case in this area, enactment of the Organized Crime Control Act of 
1970173 complicated matters substantially. The Act centralized in 
the Attorney General the federal government's power to grant 
immunity and could be read to have deprived the armed forces of any 
general power to grant immunity due to the absence of express 
reference to courts-martial. Although the military departments 
may, as federal agencies, obtain the Attorney General's permission 
to grant immunity to a witness, 174 one commentator, after a thorough 
examination of the legislative history of the Act, can find no reason to 
believe that the Act was intended to affect the armed forces in any 
other fashion.175 Notwithstanding this, Justice Rehnquist, then 
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, having opined 
that courts-martial constitute "proceedings before an agency" within 
the meaning of the Act but that Act had not repealed the armed 
forces powers to grant immunity under Kirsch, stated that immunity 
could not be granted without the consent of the Attorney General in 
any case in which the Department of Justice might have an inter-
est.176 Such a result, although in accord with the Act's spirit, hardly 
seems possible in view of the finding that the Act did not repeal the 
military's power to grant immunity and the absence in the legislative 
history of any intent to affect the armed forces. 
170 !d. at 94, 35 C.M.R. at 66. The present Manual provisions referring to immunity 
are MCM, 1969, para. 68h and Mil. R. Evid. 301(c)(1). Only a general court-martial 
convening authority may grant immunity within the armed forces. MCM 1969, para. 
68h; United States v. Villines, 13 M.J.46, 53 (C.M.A.1982); United States v. Joseph, 11 
M.J. 333, 334 (C.M.A. 1981). But see United States v. Villines, 13 M.J. 46, 61-62 
(C.M.A. 1982) (Everett, C.J. dissenting). Immunity may be granted, of course, by the 
Attorney General pursuant to statute. 
11115 C.M.A. at 96, 35 C.M.R. at 68. 
172Immunity may be granted to such persons pursuant to the Organized Crime 
Control Act of 1970, 18 U .S.C.§§ 6001-05 (1976). See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 14 
M.J. 483,485-86 (C.M.A. 1983). 
17318 u.s.c §§ 6001-05 (1976). 
174/d. at 6001, 6004. 
175Green, supra note 161, at 29-31. 
176Coast Guard Law Bulletin No. 413 setting forth the 22 September 1971 memo-
randum of the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (William H. 
Rehnquist), reprinted in part in VI Criminal Law Materials 32-50 (The Judge Advo-
cate General's School, U.S. Army 1981). For the procedure to obtain such a grant, see 
note 217 infra. 
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At present, the assumption is that Congress has implicitly granted 
the armed forces the power to grant immunity to any service 
member who may be tried by court-martial for the offense about 
which the member will testify, but that the immunity must be 
obtained under the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 whenever 
the case has Department of Justice interest. Given Justice Rehn-
quist's findings, the latter requirement albeit an excellent policy 
decision, appears a legal nullity. The real question is whether the 
armed forces in fact have power to grant immunity.177 Assuming 
that federal statute has not deprived the military of that power, one 
must reexamine Kirsch. Concededly, the court's holding in Kirsch is 
unusual and somewhat tortured and the court need not have con-
cluded as it did. The court could easily have held that, although a 
convening authority could in effect grant immunity, the Code did not 
authorize the issuance of such a grant absent trial.178 The weight of 
legal history does support Kirsch, however, and, as the armed forces 
are part of the federal government, it would also appear reasonable 
to conclude that a grant of transactional immunity179 properly issued 
by the armed forces is binding on the remainder of the federal 
government and the states.18° Any future revision of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice should resolve this matter, however, by 
creating express statutory authority for the armed forces to grant 
immunity. At present, the military system is clearly vulnerable to 
challenge in the federal district courts. 
177But see United States v. Villines, 13 M.J. 46, 61 (C.M.A. 1982) (Everett, C.J., 
dissenting) (noting that the assumption that the 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1976) did not 
preempt the military's power to grant immunity "is not indisputable."). 
178See Green, supra note 161, at 26-27. 
179 Kirsch dealt with a grant of transactional immunity. Although not fully resolved, 
it appears that the armed forces may use grants of testimonial immunity as well as 
grants of transactional immunity. See text accompanying notes 18-136 infra. 
180U.C.M.J. art. 76. In relevant part, Article 76 declares that "the proceedings ... of 
courts-martial as approved, reviewed, or affirmed as required by this chapter ... are 
final and conclusive." This interpretation of Article 76 may be erroneous in that the 
Article clearly is intended to deal with the finality and effects of convictions. Given 
that immunity in the armed forces is ultimately based upon the effects of Articles 64, 
76, and the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, however, Article 76 
might reasonably be interpreted to reach this far. If not, a grant of immunity in the 
armed forces should act to bar the use of testimony, and the product thereof, by a state 
or the federal government. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979) (grand jury 
testimony given pursuant to a grant of immunity was involuntary and could not be 
used for impeachment of the declarant at his later trial); Murphy v. Waterfront 
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
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b. The nature of the immunity required 
(1}. In general 
Following civilian precedent, military grants of immunity extend-
ed transactional immunity181 until the Supreme Court's decision in 
1972 in Kastigar v. United States that only testimonial immunity1B2 
was necessary to overcome the Fifth Amendment privilege. The 
ability of the armed forces to grant testimonial immunity since 
Kastigar has been unclear. The promulgation of the Military Rules 
of Evidence expressly authorized the granting of use immunity,l83 
but the President's rule making power under Article 36 of the Code184 
does not extend to violating congressional statute; members of the 
armed forces have been granted a statutory right against self-
incrimination which has frequently been held to be broader than the 
Fifth Amendment privilege.185 The legislative history of the statu-
tory privilege suggests that, in relevant part, it was indeed intended 
to merely echo the Fifth Amendment privilege,186 in which case the 
Court's holding in Kastigar would clearly apply to the armed forces. 
However, the holdings of the Court of Military Appeals create some 
uncertainty. Until fairly recently, the court repeatedly held that the 
statutory right was more protective than the constitutional one. 
· Although the court has since either rejected or modified this posi-
tion, 187 enough doubt exists that a reasonable argument can be 
mounted to the effect that the statutory right requires transactional 
immunity, especially since the present statutory right and all of its 
181Under transactional immunity, a witness is granted immunity from prosecution 
for any transaction or offense concerning which the witness testified. 
182406 u.s. 441 (1972). 
183Mil. R. Evid. 301(c)(1). See also United States v. Villines, 13 M.J. 46, 60 (C.M.A. 
1982) (Everett C.J., dissenting). 
184
"Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures ... may be prescribed by the President 
by regulations which shall. .• not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter." 
U.C.M.J. art. 36(a). 
185See generally, Lederer, Rights Warnings in the Armed Services, 72 Mil. L. Rev.1, 
2-9 (1976). But see United States v. Armstrong, 9 M.J. 374 (C.M.A. 1980), in which 
Chief Judge Everett rejected earlier holdings, while Judges Cook and Fletcher stated 
that nothing in the case required the court to reexamine the "settled construction of 
Article 31" that the Article " 'has a broader sweep than the Fifth Amendment.' " 9 
M.J. at 384 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 23 C.M.A. 181, 182, 48 C.M.R. 797, 798 
(1974)). The court has clearly narrowed the scope of Article 31, however. United States 
v. Armstrong, 9 M.J. 374 (C.M.A.1980); United States v. Lloyd, 10 M.J.172 (C.M.A. 
1982). 
IS6Lederer, Rights Warnings in the Armed Services, 72 Mil. L. v. 1, 6-9 (1976). See 
also United States v. Lloyd, 10 M.J.172 (C. M.A .. 1981); United States v. Armstrong, 9 
M.J. 374 (C.M.A. 1980). 
187See United States v. Lloyd, 10 M.J. 172 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v. 
Armstrong, 9 M.J. 374 (C.M.A. 1980). 
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predecessors were enacted during the period in which transactional 
immunity was viewed as constitutionally necessary to overcome the 
Fifth Amendment privilege.188 The issue seems to have been resolved 
in United States v. Villines, 189 in which a fragmented Court of Mil-
itary Appeals appears to have accepted the granting of testimonial 
immunity by a general court-martial convening authority.190 Pro-
posed Rule for Court-Martial 704(a) express accepts testimonial 
immunity. 
(2). Threat of prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction 
For immunity to overcome the right against self-incrimination, it 
must at minimum successfully protect the witness against any use of 
the testimony given pursuant to the grant including any derivative 
use thereof.191 Even if a military grant of immunity is not binding on 
the states, through either Article 76 or the Supremacy Clause, the 
Supreme Court's decision in Murphy v. Waterfront192 would protect 
the witness from use of the immunized testimony in a state court. The 
same result will follow, however, if the witness is potentially subject 
to prosecution in a foreign nation. 
The Supreme Court has yet to determine whether a witness who is 
faced with a realistic threat of foreign prosecution may refuse to 
testify in a court in the United States notwithstanding a grant of 
immunity fully effective in the United States.193 A number of federal 
district courts have considered the topic, nearly all in the context of 
witnesses granted immunity to testify before grand juries, and have, 
with little exception, held that the witness must testify.194 The hold-
ings have relied on two rationales; first, that grand jury testimony is 
secret and not likely to come to the attention of a foreign power and, 
tsssee generally E. Imwinkelried, P. Giannelli, F. Gilligan & F. Lederer, Criminal 
Evidence 304-05 (1979). 
IS913 M.J. 46 (C.M.A. 1982). See also United States v. Newman, 14 M.J. 474, 481 
(C.M.A. 1983) ("our Court has clearly authorized such immunity.") 
I90Jd. at 52-54 (Fletcher, J .); id. at 57 (Cook J., concurring in the result); id. (Everett, 
C.J., dissenting). See also United States v. Rivera, 1 M.J. 107 (C.M.A. 1975) (failing to 
raise the testimonial immunity issue), reversing on other grounds, 49 C.M.R. 259 
(A.C.M.R. 1979) (holding testimonial immunity lawful). 
191Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
192378 u.s. 52 (1964). 
I93Zicarelli v. Commission of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1974) (intentionally not 
deciding the issue). 
194See generally E. Imwinkelried, P. Giannelli, F. Gilligan & F. Lederer Criminal 
Evidence 300-02 (1979); VI Criminal Law Materials 32-11 (The Judge Advocate 
General's School, U.S. Army 1981). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Martin 
Flanagan, 81 C.V. 3978 Nat. L. J., March 8, 1982, at 2, col. 3 (E.D. N.Y. 1982). 
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second, that absent extradition, 195 the witness may avoid foreign 
prosecution simply by not traveling to the foreign nation. To the 
extent that these holdings are correct as they relate to civilian life, 196 
they hardly seem applicable to the armed forces. Testimony before 
military proceedings, including the functional equivalent of the 
grand jury, the Article 32 proceeding,197 is almost never secret. 
Furthermore, service members are subject to involuntary transfer 
to virtually any nation in the world. Indeed, trial may be taking place 
in a country with an interest in trying the accused.198 Consequently, 
the civilian law seems inapposite. The Court of Military Appeals was 
faced with a case involving a threat offoreign prosecution in 1956,199 
when an accused complained that a Korean civilian witness was 
erroneously forced to testify at his court-martial despite his reliance 
on the right against self-incrimination because of possible trial in 
Japan. In dicta, not joined by any other member of the court, Judge 
Latimer stated that both the constitutional and statutory200 rights 
against self-incrimination extended only to" 'a reasonable fear or 
prosecution' under the Law of the United States."201 
The right against self-incrimination is a favored right under 
American law. Although the government does have a right to "every 
man's evidence", that right is contingent on the right to remain 
silent. Where potential foreign prosecution is possible, at least when 
that prosecution is a consequence of military service, the privileges 
against self-incrimination should apply absent immunity which is 
effective to prevent the use or derivative use of immunized testimony 
195The possibility of extradition does not appear to have been taken seriously in 
many of the cases. 
196 At the heart of the question is the probability of successful overseas prosecution. 
This necessarily requires one to determine not only foreign law but also the probabil-
ity of overseas interest in prosecution and the probability that the jurisdiction can 
reach the American accused. In Flanagan, the witness held joint U.S. and Irish 
citizenship and was an unindicted co-conspirator in a plan to ship weapons to Ireland 
and Great Britain. The trial judge held that both Ireland and Northern Ireland 
enforced their laws implicitly making prosecution likely. 
197U.C.M.J. art. 32. 
198A foreign host nation clearly has an interest in trying an American service 
member who has violated its laws or injured its people. The United States has 
negotiated Status of Forces Agreements or concluded executive agreements with 
many host nations which generally result in court-martial of nearly all such offenders. 
However, foreign trial is a clear possibility and in some countries for some types of 
offenses a probability. 
199United States v. Murphy, 7 C.M.A. 32, 21 C.M.R. 158 (1956). 
2oou.C.M.J. art. 31. 
2017 C.M.A. at 37, 21 C.M.R. at 163, (citing Slochower v. Board of Education, 1!50 
U.S. {1956)). Judge Latimer's reliance on Slochower was misplaced. See, e.g., note 193 
supra. 
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in a prosecution in any jurisdiction, domestic or foreign. 
c. Consequences of granting immunity 
(1). At trial 
Pursuant to the Military Rules of Evidence: 
When a prosecution witness ... has been granted immun-
ity or leniency in exchange for tsetimony, the grant shall 
be reduced to writing and shall be served on the accused 
prior to arraignment or within a reasonable time before 
the witness testifies. If notification is not made as required 
by this rule, the military judge may grant a continuance 
until notification is made, prohibit or strike the testimony 
of the witness, or enter such other order as may be 
required. 202 
The Rule thus insures the defense a meaningful opportunity to cross-
examine the immunized prosecution witness. The Rule is taken from 
the decision of the Court of Military Appeals in United States v. 
Webster203 and its analysis states that disclosure should be made 
prior to arraignment.204 
(2). To the immunized wit:aess 
When the witness has been granted transactional immunity, 205 the 
witness may not be later prosecuted by the armed forces206 for any 
offense included within the grant.207 When the witness has been 
given testimonial immunity,208 the witness may later be prosecuted, 
but only if the prosecution can adequately show in court, by evi-
dence,209 that the government has not relied on the immunized tes-
202Mil. R. Evid. 301(c)(2). 
2o31 M.J. 216 (C.M.A. 1975). 
204Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, 1969, Analy-
sis of Rule 301(c)(2), reprinted at MCM, 1969, A18-11. 
2°5See generally text accompanying notes 181-90 supra. 
206It is unclear whether the accused could be prosecuted lawfully by a civilian 
jurisdiction. See accompanying notes 161-80 supra. 
207The accused may be prosecuted for committing perjury while testifying pursuant 
to the immunity grant. 
2°8Testimonial immunity protects the witness against subsequent use of the testi-
mony and any product derivative of it with the possible exception of the discovery of a 
live witness as a result. Cf. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978). Testimonial 
immunity is sometimes known as "use plus fruits" immunity. 
209The rules of evidence may not apply to this showing. Mil. R. Evid. 104(a). It is 
unclear, however, whether either Federal or Military Rule of Evidence 104(a) applies 
in determinations involving constitutional rights. 
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timony or any product thereof. 210 It appears from the decision of the 
Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Rivera211 that the Court 
of Military Appeals will strictly hold the government to this 
requirement and it is probable that the government cannot prose-
cute a previously immunized witness without being able to prove 
that the case preparation was complete prior to the witness' testi-
money pursuant to the grant, 212 and even then only if the trial counsel 
can be shown to be unaware of the nature of the testimony given 
under the grant.213 A subsequently prosecuted witness may raise a 
prior immunity grant on a motion to dismiss. 214 A previously immun-
ized accused may not be impeached at trial with testimony given 
pursuant to the grant as such testimony is deemed coerced and 
involuntary. 215 
(3). Post-trial 
Within the armed forces, immunity may only be granted by the 
convening authority216 or by the action of a convening authority.217 
From 1958 until1983, the Court of Military Appeals reasoned that it 
was unlikely that a convening authority would grant or obtain 
immunity for a witness who was not expected to testify truthfully. 
Consequently, it has consistently held that, by granting immunity, 
the convening authority218 and staff judge advocate219 involved in the 
210Mil. R. Evid. 301(c)(1). See also United States v. Rivera, 1 M.J. 107 (C.M.A.1975). 2111 M.J.107 (C.M.A. 1975). See also United States v. Whitehead, 5 M.J. 294 (C. M.A. 
1978). 
212This rule may not extend so far as to prevent use of a new witness discovered via 
the immunized testimony, see United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268(1978), although 
any logical analysis of the right against self-incrimination would result in exclusion of 
such evidence. 
213Knowledge of the probable nature of a witness' response which permits highly 
useful trial preparation should be considered improper fruit of the immunized tes-
timony. See United States v. Rivera, 1 M.J. 107 (C.M.A. 1975). 
214MCM, 1969, para. 68h. 
215New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979). 
216The convening authority may grant immunity to any service member subject to 
referral of charges and trial by that convening authority. See text accompanying notes 
161-80 supra. 
217When a convening authority lacks the power to immunize a witness because that 
person is not subject to court-martial, immunity may be obtained from the Depart-
ment of Justice based upon the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. 
6001-05 (1976). See Criminal Law Items, Grants of Immunity, The Army Lawyer, Dec. 
1973, at 22-25; Criminal Law Items, Addendum, The Army Lawyer, Feb. 1974, at 14. 
218See, e.g., United States v. Espiet-Betrancourt, 1 M.J. 91 (C.M.A. 1975); United 
States v. Williams, 21 C.M.A. 292, 45 C.M.R. 66 (1972). But see United States v. 
Griffin, 8 M.J. 66 (C.M.A. 1979) (disqualification is not required when a defense 
witness is immunized). 
219See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 4 M.J. 8 (C.M.A.1977); United States v. Diaz, 
22 C.M.A. 52, 46 C.M.R. 52 (1972). 
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grant were disqualified from taking post-trial actions. The Court 
repudiated this doctrine in its entirety in United States v. Newman, 220 
reasoning that the advent of testimonial immunity coupled with the 
adoption of Military Rule of Evidence 607, which provides that a 
party may impeach his or her own witnesses, had eliminated any 
possibility that a convening authority or staff judge advocate could 
be viewed as having vouched for a witness' credibility by issuing a 
grant of immunity. The court did not, however, determine the effect 
of a grant of transactional immunity declaring, however, that the 
"key inquiry is whether [the convening authority's] actions before or 
during the trial create, or appear to create, a risk that he will be 
unable to evaluate objectively and impartially all the evidence in the 
record of trial .... "221 
III. CONFRONTATION AND 
COMPULSORY PROCESS 
A. IN GENERAL 
From the perspective of an accused, perhaps the most important 
constitutional protections are the Sixth Amendment rights to con-
frontation and compulsory process, the rights which, with the right 
against self-incrimination, epitomize the adversary system.222 
Viewed in general terms, the right to confrontation gives the accused 
the right to be present at trial223 and to confront the evidence offered 
by the prosecution, and the right to compulsory process gives the 
defense the right to obtain and present evidence in its behalf. Clearly, 
the two rights are interdependent and must be viewed together, 
although Professor Westen has correctly suggested that, of the two, 
compulsory process is probably more important; the right to present 
defense evidence is likely more valuable than the ability to contest 
prosecution evidence inasmuch as the former may correct for mis-
takes in the latter.224 Were the Sixth Amendment rights to confron-
tation and compulsory process, both applicable to courts-martial,225 
22014 M.J. 474 (C.M.A. 1983). 
221/d. at 482. 
222 A careful analysis will indicate that the privilege against self-incrimination is the 
foundation stone of the adversary system as, without it, the burden of proof could be 
effectively placed on the defendant. The confrontation and compulsory process rights 
supply the tools necessary to make the adversary system function. 
223See note 229 infra. See also Confrontation and Compulsory Process, infra note 232, 
at 569. 
224Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 183 (1974). 
225The Court of Military Appeals has held that the Bill of Rights applies to members 
of the armed forces unless expressly or implicitly excepted. See, e.g., United States v. 
Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-4 7 (1960). In addition, Article 46 of 
the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for equal access to witnesses for the 
prosecution, defense, and court-martial while providing for compulsory process. 
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to be interpreted in a literal and expansive fashion, it is apparent 
that present evidentiary and procedural standards would be greatly 
affected. At the every least, the confrontation right would constitu-
tionalize the hearsay rule and render all hearsay inadmissible. Con-
sequently, it is not surprising that most commentators have rejected 
such interpretation. 226 The Supreme Court, while also rejecting such 
literal interpretation, 227 has refused to fully acknowledge the dimen-
sions of the two rights, preferring to deal with confrontation and 
compulsory process issues on a case by case basis. The pragmatic 
utility of the rights to the defense primarily stems from their 
unsettled nature. The adversary system that they protect has been 
incorporated into military criminal law by the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice228 and case law. It is in the question of how they 
affect specific areas of the law, areas which are still unresolved, that 
they are pragmatically important and present the able defense coun-
sel with significant opportunities. Accordingly, having examined 
the present procedural mechanisms for procuring evidence, it is 
appropriate to turn to an examination of the effects of the Sixth 
Amendment on that procurement and on the admissibility of evi-
dence. Given that this entire area is a developing one, the focus of this 
examination is necessarily on the decisions of the Supreme Court 
rather than the Court of Military Appeals. 
B. THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION 
1. In general 
The Sixth Amendment declares: "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him .... "At a minimum, the right to confrontation gives the 
accused the right to be present at trial229 to confront the evidence 
226See, e.g., Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter 
Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99 (1972); note 224 supra. 
WE.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970). 
msee, e.g., U.C.M.J. art 46. Most of the usual features of the adversary system are 
arguably inherent in the Uniform Code's provisions for counsel, U.C.M.J. arts. 27, 38, 
and the right against self-incrimination found in Article 31. 
229 The confrontation rights does not extend to the accusation stage of proceedings, 
see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.103, 119-25 (1975) (implied); McCrayv. Illinois, 386 U.S. 
300 (1967); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 n.2 (1967); but see Roviaro v. United 
States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), or to the type of sentencing proceedings usually followed by 
civilian jurisdictions. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). But cf. Gardner 
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion) (in cases in which death penalty 
might be imposed, due process requires that defendant be allowed to inspect evidence 
used in sentencing); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (when special sentencing 
procedures for specific crimes, e.g., sex offenses, exist, due process requires, inter alia, 
confrontation of witnesses). See a/.so Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c). The peculiar nature of 
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offered by the government on the issue of guilt or innocence230 unless 
the accused has waived that right in some fashion.231 Presumably, 
the framers intended the confrontation right to have some greater 
import. The question then is how far, if at all, the Sixth Amendment 
protects the accused against admission of various forms of evidence. 232 
2. The Right to Compel the Government to Produce Witnesses Whose 
Statements are Used at Trial 
a. In general 
Construed narrowly, the right to be present at trial is of use to the 
defendant only because the accused is thus aware of the govern-
ment's evidence; the accused is thereby enabled to prepare and pre-
sent a defense. If this were the limits of the Sixth Amendment, 
however, the government could subject the defendant to "trial by 
affidavit" as long as the defendant was faced with the evidence in 
court. Yet it has been obvious since the earliest confrontation cases 
that the prohibition of trials by affidavit is a basic concept of confron-
tation. 233 Consequently the Sixth Amendment must limit the govern-
ment's ability to present its case in hearsay form to some degree. 
b. Available witnesses 
Notwithstanding the large number of hearsay exceptions which do 
not require unavailable declarants,234 the Supreme Court has not as 
military sentencing, e.g., adversarial and an independent part of trial, may require 
application of the right. The confrontation clause also protects the accused against ex 
parte proceedings which are unauthorized under the jurisdiction's law.E.g., Parkerv. 
Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892); United 
States v. Reynolds, 489 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1973) (harmless error on facts). However, the 
right to be present at trial does not merely incorporate the jurisdiction's law by 
reference, but stands as an independent standard of the validity of local statutes that 
allow trial in absentia. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948). 
230See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Dowdell v. United States, 221 
U.S. 325 (1911) (interpretation of Phillipines Bill of Rights). 
231Voluntary absence from trial after arraignment permits trial in absentia. Taylor 
v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973) (per curiam); United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 
1202 (2d Cir. 1972). Compare United States v. Peebles, 3 M.J. 177 (C.M.A. 1977) 
(absence held to be involuntary) with United States v. Condon, 3 M.J. 782 (A.C.M.R. 
1977) (voluntary absence). If there is trial in absentia, the judge might instruct the 
court members that they can draw no inference of guilt from the defendant's absence. 
The conduct of the accused may also constitute an implicit waiver of the right to 
present. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); United States v. Cook, 20 C.M.A. 504,43 
C.M.R. 344 (1971). 
232For an outstanding analysis of this matter in conjunction with the compulsory 
process clauses, see Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory 
of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567,570 (1978) [hereinafter cited as 
Confrontation and Compulsory Process]. 
233See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895). 
234See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803 (twenty-three enumerated exceptions and a residual 
general exception). 
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yet expressly held constitutional hearsay evidence against an accused 
who could not cross-examine the declarant235 when that confronta-
tion might have been useful to the accused.236 Instead, although there 
are clear indications that the Court will recognize exceptions to this 
general rule, present case law appears to bar admission of hearsay 
evidence against the accused when the hearsay declarant is available 
for cross-examination.237 The government thus must produce the 
declarant in person before introducing an out-of-court statement 
against the accused.2as In determining when a witness is available,239 
the Court has rejected the argument that the government has no 
obligation to produce witnesses from beyond its territorial boundar-
ies.240 Similarly, the government cannot rely merely on its regular 
procedures for producing witnesses and must make a good faith 
effort to use all practical methods to produce the witness in person.241 
The government is not required to attempt to produce a witness in 
person if it can show the likely failure of its efforts. 242 The question of 
whether the government has met its obligation to produced a witness 
is a constitutional one, however, and the standard is strict.243 
235Given the general definition of hearsay, see, e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 801(c), a statement 
made out of court offered for its truth remains hearsay notwithstanding the fact that 
its declarant is present in court subject to cross-examination. When the declarant is so 
available, both the Federal and Military Rules of Evidence define as nonhearsay three 
types of statements, Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1); Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1), but the general 
rule is far more expansive than the exceptions. 
2360hio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 n. 7 (1980) stated: "A demonstration ofunavailabil-
ity, however is not always required. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), for 
example, the Court found the utility of trial confrontation so remote that it did not 
require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available. witness." 
231/d. at 65. The Court did, however, suggest that there may well be exceptions as it 
declared: "In the usual case . .. the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate 
the unavailability of the declarant .... " I d. (emphasis added). See also note 236 supra 
as to one such "exception". It seems quite probable that the Court will accept the 
clearly established hearsay exceptions-particularly the business record exception. 
See note 260 and text accompanying notes 248-326 infra. 
238Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900). 
239See e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 804(a). 
24°Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). 
241Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (recognizing increased cooperation among 
prison officials in temporarily transferring inmates needed as witnesses). See United 
States v. Davis, 19 C.M.A. 217, 221, 41 C.M.R. 217, 221 (1970); United States v. 
Obligacion, 17 C.M.A. 36, 37, 37 C.M.R. 300, 301 (1967); United States v. Valli, 7 
C.M.A. 60,21 C.M.R.186 (1956); United States v. Troutman, 42 C.M.R. 419 (A.C.M.R. 
1970); United States v. Chatmon, 41 C.M.R. 807 (N.C.M.R. 1970). See also United 
States v. Gaines, 20 C.M.A. 557, 43 C.M.R. 397 (1971); United States v. Hodge, 20 
C.M.A. 412,415,43 C.M.R. 252,255 (1971) (Ferguson, J., concurring); United States v. 
Miller, 7 C.M.A. 23, 30, 21 C.M.R. 149, 156 (1956). 
242Compare Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) and United States v. Daniels, 23 
C.M.A. 94, 48 C.M.R. 655 (C.M.A. 1974) with Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). 
243See United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.1974). 
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Although it could be argued that the confrontation clause would 
allow the government to try a defendant by affidavit as long as the 
witness was present at trial for defense cross-examination, the Court 
has repeatedly implied that, before the government will be permit-
ted to use out-of-court statements of an available witness, the 
government must first call the witness244 during its case-in-chief and 
attempt to obtain the testimony directly from the witness under oath 
and in the presence of the jury.245 Though reliability would exist if 
the government presented its case in hearsay form while allowing 
the defendant to call the declarant as witness, there are sound rea-
sons for requiring the government to present its evidence via direct 
examination. If hearsay were used as part of the government's pre-
sentation, for example, the jury could be left with an initial impres-
sion not easily erasable by defense examination of the declarant after 
the prosecution rested.246 In addition, the defendant would be placed 
in the difficult position of having to call us a defense witness a person 
whose testimony is likely to be adverse.247 
c. Unavailable witnesses 
(1). In general 
The confrontation right necessarily asks whether the government 
is estopped from introducing out-of-court statements by witnesses 
who are unavailable for courtroom examination. If confrontation 
includes such a rule, it would presuppose "that evidence in any form 
other than direct testimony is too unr.eliable ever to be used against 
the accused in a criminal proceeding."248 Not only would confronta-
tion contain procedural guarantees, but the concept would imply 
that a substantive constitutional standard governs admissibility of 
evidence. Rejecting this approach, the Supreme Court has suggested 
that the state may use out-of-courts statements as long as the prose-
cution cannot produce the evidence in a more reliable form. In Mat-
tox v. United States,249 the Court allowed various statements, prior 
244See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring in result); 
Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses 
Another One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99, 108, 143 (1972). 
245Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); 
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). 
246See United States v. Oates, 560 F .2d 45, 82 n.39 (2d Cir. 1977); Westen, supra note 
232, at 578-79. 
247The problem is mitigated in part by allowing the witness' credibility to be 
impeached by any party, including the party calling him. Mil. R. Evid. 607. See Fed. 
R. Evid. 607, Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 266-67 (1972). 
24SConfrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 583. 
249159 u.s. 237 (1895). 
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recorded testimony and a dying declaration, to be used against the 
defendant after the prosecution showed that the declarant was dead 
and that the evidence was unavailable in a more reliable form.250 
Similarly, in California v. Green,251 the Court held that the state 
could use testimony given at a preliminary hearing once the prosecu-
tion had attempted and failed to obtain the testimony from the 
witness on direct examination. In Ohio v. Roberts,252 testimony given 
by the witness at a preliminary hearing was held admissible after 
the state had shown that the witness was unavailable. When the 
evidence in the out-of-court statement has been available and produ-
cible in the more reliable form of in-court testimony, the confronta-
tion clause has barred use of the out-of-court statement.253 One series 
of cases precludes use of an out-of-court statement when the declar-
ant could not be cross-examined because of physical absence from 
the courtroom. However, examination of these cases reveal that 
prosecutorial neglect or misconduct caused the witness' unavailabil-
ity,254 suggesting an underlying due process violation. In a second 
series of decisions, out-of-court statements have been excluded when 
the declarant, though physically present, asserted the right against 
250See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899). 
251399 u.s. 149 (1970). 
252448 u.s. 56 (1980). 
253The standard to be applied in determining availability is unclear. In Ohio v. 
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980), the Court quoted Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724, 
725 (1968), for the proposition that a "witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of ... the 
exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have 
made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial." (emphasis added in Ohio v. 
Roberts). Having declared that no effort to obtain a witness need be made when there 
is clearly no possibility of doing so successfully, such as in the event of death of the 
witness, the Court stated: 
But if there is a possibility, albeit remote, that affirmative measures 
might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith may demand 
their effectuation. "The lengths to which the prosecution must go to 
produce a witness ... is a question of reasonabledness." California v. 
Green 299 U.S. at 189, n. 22 (concurring opinion citing Barber v. Page, 
supra). 
448 U.S. at 74 (emphasis in the original). Given that Justice Brennan dissented in 
Ohio v. Roberts on the ground that the government failed to make a bonafide search to 
find the missing hearsay declarant, 448 U.S. at 79-82, it is apparent that the mere 
possibility of obtaining the declarant is not enough to prevent use of the hearsay 
declaration authored by the missing witness. On the other hand, the dissent seems to 
necessarily conclude that the government did not in fact make a good faith effort to 
find the witness. Given this view of the facts, the proper interpretation of the majori-
ty's opinion is at best uncertain. 
254See, e.g., Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 
(1968); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); 
Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); Kirbyv. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899). 
For the analysis of these cases, see Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 
232, at 584 n.43. 
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self-incrimination.255 Again, these cases suggest that prosecutorial 
conduct played a role and that the prosecution could have made the 
declarant available. When the challenged statements were made by 
co-defendants on trial with the accused, for example, severance of 
the trials might have obviated the self-incrimination issue.256 Alter-
natively, the government could have tried the declarants before 
trying the defendant against whom the statements were to be used. 257 
Finally, if the declarants continued to claim their self-incrimination 
privilege, they could have been made available by a grant of testi-
monial immunity.2ss 
The Court has, however, never declared that the confrontation 
clause is satisfied merely by offering evidence in its best available 
form. Instead, the clause contains a two-part standard controlling 
admissibility, regardless of whether the evidence exists in a better 
form. Initially, the confrontation clause establishes a rule of neces-
sity: "in the usual case ... the prosecution must either produce, or 
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it 
wishes to use against the defendant."259 Once the declarant is shown 
to be unavailable, the out-of-court statement is admissible only if it 
bears adequate "indicia of reliability"260 which "serve as adequate 
substitutes for the right of cross-examination."261 
(2). Unavailability 
A declarant can be unavailable because of death, disappearance, 
illness, amnesia, or insanity,262 exercise of a testimonial privilege,2sa 
or because of "imprisonment, military necessity, nonamenability to 
255See Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 
(1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). But see Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 
62 (1979). 
256Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 585 n.43. See generally 
text accompanying notes 400-10 infm. 
251Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 585 n.43. 
256Jd. at 581-82 n.38. 
259Qhio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). See notes 236-37, 253supra. An alternative 
statement defines necessity as "the State's 'need' to introduce relevant evidence that 
through no fault of its own cannot be introduced in any other way." California v. 
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 167 n.16 (1970). 
2soDutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,89 (1970). See also Ohiov. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 
(1980). The trier of fact must have "a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the 
prior statement." California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 161. 
261Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 533 (5th Cir. 1972). 
262Mil. R. Evid. 804(a)(3), (4). See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980). 
2saMn. R. Evid. 804(a)(1), (2). 
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process. or other reasonable cause."264 
As the Supreme Court has stated, "a witness is not 'unavailable' for 
purposes of ... the exception to the confrontation requirement unless 
the prosecutorial authorities have made a good faith effort to obtain 
his presence at trial."265 While the prosecution is not required to 
perform "a futile act" to locate the witness, 266 the good faith standard 
might be met even if the prosecution fails to take steps that offer a 
remote possibility of producing the witness.267 The essential stand-
ard is one of reasonableness.268 Thus, a witness is unavailable when 
for some reason, the witness is beyond the reach of the court-
martial.269 However, actual unavailability must be established and 
the prosecution must produce independent evidence of the witness' 
actual departure.270 Unless the prosecution has made a good faith 
effort to secure the witness, imprisonment does not make the witness 
unavailable. 271 
When a witness with relevant information properly invokes a 
2o4U.C.M.J. art. 49(d)(2), incorporated in Mil. R. Evid. 804(d)(6). See Mil. R. Evid. 
804(d)(5). It is unclear as to what would constitute adequate "military necessity." 
When the provision was included in the Military Rules of Evidence, its general utility 
was considered questionable in view of the procedents dealing with depositions. See, 
e.g., United States v. Davis, 19 C.M.A. 217, 223-24, 41 C.M.R. 217, 223-24 (1970). 
265Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968). 
266Qhio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74. 
2•7See note 253 supra. See United States v. Bright, 9 M.J. 789 (A.C.M.R. 1980). But 
see Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). 
266Qhio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 7 4. Compare Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972), 
with Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). 
2•9 Although U.C.M.J. art. 49(d)(1), permits the use of depositions when the witness 
is outside the civil jurisdiction in which trial takes place or is more than one hundred 
miles from the location of trial, the Court of Military Appeals has limited the Article to 
civilian witnesses. United States v. Davis, 19 C. M.A. 217,41 C.M.R. 217 (1970); United 
States v. Ciarletta, 7 C. M.A. 606, 614, 23 C.M.R. 70,78 (1957). The court's reasoning in 
Davis, to the extent that the jury must weigh the demeanor of the witness, 19 C.M.A. 
220,41 C.M.R. at220 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968)), suggests that 
the Article may be invalid as to civilians as well. See also United States v. Chatmon, 41 
C.M.R. 807 (N.C.M.R. 1970). 
270United States v. Davis, 19 C.M.A. at 224, 41 C.M.R. at 224; United States v. 
Troutman, 42 C.M.R. 419 (A.C.M.R. 1970). See United States v. Johnson, 44 C.M.R. 
414 (A.C.M.R. 1971). The same analysis applies when the witness is allegedly unwil-
lingto appear. United States v. Obligacion,17 C.M.A. 36, 37 C.M.R. 300 (1967); United 
Statesv. Stringer, 5 C.M.A.122, 17 C.M.R.122 (1954). See United States v. Daniels, 23 
C.M.A. 94,48 C.M.R. 655 (1974). Compare United States v. Gaines, 20 C.M.A. 557, 43 
C.M.R. 397 (1971) and United States v. Hodge, 20 C.M.A. 412, 43 C.M.R. 252 (1971) 
(dictum) (unavailability caused by the discharge of witness at government's conven-
ience), with United States v. Dempsey, 2 M.J. 242 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976) (witness was 
expected to appear at trial; government did not cause unavailability). 
271Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). 
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privilege against testifying,272 the witness is unavailable. Such a 
situation can present either a confrontation or compulsory process 
issue. If the government can remedy the reason for the exericse of the 
privilege, as by granting immunity to a defense witness who has 
exercised the right against self-incrimination, a compulsory process 
is presented. When the government offers the hearsay statement of a 
witness who will not be subject to cross-examination, a confrontation 
issue is posed. It is, however, almost always the exercise of a witness' 
privilege against self-incrimination which results in litigation. The 
conflict could be obviated by giving the witness testimonial immu-
nity. 273 However, the courts have been extremely reluctant to compel 
the government to provide use immunity to a witness not yet tried. 
The grant of immunity has been required only when the prosecution 
intentionally disrupts thefact-findingprocess, when there is a viola-
tion of due process, when the prosecution acts on the basis of religion, 
race, or other discriminatory criteria, or when the potential testi-
mony is clearly necessary and exculpatory.274 In some situations, 
though, the government's interest in withholding immunity is min-
imal compared to the defendant's interest in obtaining the testimony. 
If the prosecution has already prepared its case against the witness, 
there is, at most, a slight burden on the prosecution of having to trace 
its evidence to independent sources. Thus, the prosecution cannot 
claim that its ability to prosecute would be hindered by granting 
immunity, and the prosecution should be forced to choose between 
granting immunity or striking the witness' testimony.275 
272The usual situation involves the privilege against self-incrimination, though 
assertion of any testimonial privilege makes the witness unavailable, see Mil. R. Evid. 
804(a)(1), and may require any direct testimony to be struck should the privilege be 
exercised on cross. See note.333 infra. A persistent wrongful refusal to testify on the 
grounds of privilege will also make the declarant unavailable. Mil. R. Evid. 804(a)(2). 
See Confrontation and CompulsOr?J Process, supra note 232, at 584 n.43. If joinder is 
the problem, severance can be ordered. See MCM, 1969, para. 26d. 
273See text accompanying notes 181-201 infra. 
274United States v. Villines, 13 M.J. 46 (C.M.A.1982); United States v. Barham, 625 
F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1980); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d 
Cir. 1980); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lowell, 490 F. Supp. 897 
(D.N.J. 1980); United States v. De Palma, 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
275Even if there is no violation of the defendant's confrontation rights, his or her 
rights under Article 47 may be violated. 
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(3). Indicia of reliability 
Before the prosecution may offer a hearsay statement made by an 
unavailable declarant against the accused at trial on the merits, 
it must demonstrate that the statement has sufficient "indicia of 
reliability"276 to effectively substitute for defense cross-examination 
of the witness. 277 Although the Supreme Court has failed to delineate 
with great precision what constitutes adequate indicia of reliability, 
it has stated: "Reliability can be inferred without more in a case 
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In 
other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing 
of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."278 The Court has 
failed to indicate which of the numerous hearsay exceptions are 
"firmly rooted" in its judgment except to note with approval dying 
declarations, former testimony which was subject to cross-examina-
tion, and business and public records.279 Because of their potential 
importance to military practice, closer examination of a number of 
hearsay exceptions are appropriate. 
(a). Former testimony 
Under Military Rule of Evidence 804(b)(l), former or prior 
recorded testimony is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. 
The basic prerequisite for this exception is that the party against 
whom the testimony is offered has "had an opportunity and similar 
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examina-
tion."280 This requirement is the "indicia of reliability" that satisfies 
the confrontation clause. In California v. Green,281 the declarant's 
276Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,89 (1970). 
217See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1980). 
218/d. at 66 (footnote omitted). The utility of the "residual" hearsay exceptions, Mil. 
R. Evid. 803(24) and 804(b )(5), is unclear under this test. Neither exception is a "firmly 
rooted exception," yet both are contingent upon the proffered hearsay being material, 
probative and "having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" as 
the enumerated exceptions. See United States v. Ruffin, 12 M.J. 952 (A.F.C.M.R. 
1982) (hearsay statements by minors held admissible under Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(5)). 
279/d. at n.8. 
280Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). The record of the previous proceeding or hearing must be 
verbatim. !d. See also United States v. Norris, 16 C. M.A. 574, 37 C.M.R. 194 (1967). 
When the former testimony is offered against the defendant, the adequacy of the 
accused's representation by counsel should be considered as an element of the "oppor-
tunity and similar motive" requirement. Analysis of the 1980 Amendment to the 
Manual for Courts-Martial Analysis of Mil. R. Evid. 804, reprinted at MCM, 1969, 
A18-109. Direct and redirect examination of one's own witness may very often be 
equivalent to cross-examination. See Ohiov. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-71 & n.ll; Mil. R. 
Evid. 607; Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1); Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 324. 
281399 u.s. 149 (1970). 
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statement had been made at a preliminary hearing "under circum-
stances closely approximating those that surround the typical 
trial,"282 and the Supreme Court suggested that an opportunity to 
cross-examine would have been sufficient under the circumstances. 283 
The Court expanded this into a functional analysis in Ohio v. 
Roberts.284 The declarant in Roberts had testified as a defense witness 
at the preliminary hearing and then disappeared. At the prelimi-
nary hearing, defense counsel had questioned the declarant in a 
fashion very similar to that of cross-examination. 285 Because the 
questioning "comported with the principal purpose of the cross-
examination"286 by challenging the declarant's veracity, the testi-
mony was held sufficiently reliable for confrontation purposes.287 
As the drafters of the Military Rules of Evidence noted, the unique 
nature of Artice 32 investigations288 raises the question of how this 
hearsay exception applies to Article 32 hearings.289 Article 32 hear-
ings are designed "to function as discovery devices for the defense as 
well to recommend an appropriate disposition of charges .... "290 
Merely having an opportunity to develop the witness' testimony is not 
enough; there must be a similar motive in each proceeding to do so. 291 
Thus, if a defense counsel only uses the Article 32 hearing for discov-
ery purposes, the Rule prohibits use of Article 32 testimony under 
this exception unless the requisite similar motive existed.292 While 
defense counsel's expression of intent during the Article 32 hearing 
is not subsequently binding on the military judge at trial,293 the 
prosecution has the burden of establishing admissibility and the 
282ld. at 165. See United States v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960); 
United States v. Eggers, 3 C.M.A. 191, 11 C.M.R. 191 (1953); United States v. Chest-
nut, 4 M.J. 642 (A.F.C.M.R. 1977). 
283California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 165-66. SeeR. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modern 
Approach to Evidence 474-75 (2d ed. 1983). 
284448 u.s. 56 (1980). 
285Jd. at 70 n.11. Reliability depends on the particular facts of each case instead of 
whether the witness was technically on cross-examination. See id. at 7. 
286ld. at 71 (emphasis in original). 
281Id. at 71, 73. 
288U.C.M.J. art. 32. 
289 Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, Analysis of 
Rule 804, reprinted at MCM, 1969, A18-109. 
290Id. (citing Hutson v. United States, 19 C.M.A. 437, 42 C.M.R. 39 (1970); United 
States v. Samuels, 10 C. M.A. 206, 212, 27 C.M.R. 280, 286 (1959)). See United States v. 
Obligacion, 17 C.M.A. 36, 38, 37 C.M.R. 300, 302 (1967). 
291Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). The similar motive requirement exists to insure sufficient 
identify of issues, thus creating an adequate interest in examining the witness. S. 
Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 652 (3d ed. 1982) [herein-
after cited as Saltzburg & Redden]. 
292See note 289 supra. 
293Analysis of Rule 804, reprinted at MCM, 1969, A18-110. 
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burden may be impossible to meet if defense counsel adequately 
raises the issue at trial. 294 To obviate this problem, the better practice 
is for a defense counsel who is using the Artice 32 hearing primarily 
for discovery purposes to announce that strategy during the 
hearing.295 
While the typical scenario involves an attempt by the prosecution 
to introduce prior recorded testimony against the defendant, the 
reverse is also possible. Assuming the prior record is verbatim and 
properly authenticated,296 the accused may want to use favorable 
testimony given at the earlier Article 32 hearing. If the government 
had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the witness' tes-
timony at the Article 32 hearing, the testimony should be admit-
ted. 297 It should be noted that these requirements are inapplicable if 
counsel merely wishes to do is to impeach the in-court testimony of a 
witness with testimony given at the Article 32 hearing. In such a 
case, the evidence is not being offered for its truth and no hearsay 
objection applies.298 
(b). Business and public records" 
Under Military Rules of Evidence 803(6) and (8), records of regu-
larly conducted activity and public records and reports are admissi-
ble as exceptions to the hearsay rule. The essential requirement for 
the "business records" exception is that the record be made and kept 
"in the course of a regularly conducted business activity."299 Justifi-
294Jd. 
295Jd. 
296Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(1), 902(4). 
297United States v. Henry, 448 F. Supp. 819, 821 (D.N.J. 1978); United States v. 
Driscoll, 445 F. Supp. 864, 866 (D.N.J. 1978). See United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d 
512, 516-17 (4th Cir. 1979). Contra Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 657. See 
United States v. Atkins, 618 F.2d 366, 373 (5th Cir. 1980). The analysis is more 
complicated if the government is not represented by counsel at the Article 32 investi-
gation. See MCM, 1969, para. 34c. Adopting the functional analysis of Ohio v. Roberts, 
448 U.S. 56 (1980), the relevant inquiry should be the effect of the investigating 
officer's examination of the declarant and the qualifications of the investigating 
officer. See also MCM, 1969, para. 34a; Mil. 'R. Evid. 804(b)(1); note 218 supra. · 
298Mil. R. Evid. 801(c). 
299Mil. R. Evid. 804(6). See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 
308 {basis of exception). The specific list of records given in the rule are normally 
records of regularly conducted activity in the armed forces. Analysis of the 1980 
Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial Analysis of Mil. R. Evid. 803(6), 
reprinted at MCM, 1969, A18-104. See United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 580, 45 
C.M.R. 353, 354 (1972). If the circumstances surrounding the making of the report 
indicate a lack oftrm,;tworthiness, the report can be excluded. Mil. R. Evid. 803(6). See 
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). But cf. United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. at 
582, 45 C.M.R. at 356 (when analyst is called to testify, issue is weight to be given to lab 
report, not initial admissibility). 
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cation for the public records exception lies in "the assumption that a 
public official will perform his duty properly and the unlikelihood 
that he will remember details independently of the record."300 These 
assumptions constitute the "indicia of reliability" satisfying the con-
frontation clause in this instance.301 It is primarily the application of 
these exceptions to laboratory reports and the effect of the confronta-
tion clause which has plagued the military courts;302 the Court of 
Military Appeals has held that such reports are properly admitted 
under the business record exception. 303 In the view of the court, a 
chemical analysis is inherently neutral; the chemist's job is to ana-
lyze the substance, not exercise prosecutorial discretion, 304 and there 
is no reason to suspect the chemist of bias. The court's conclusions are 
subject to dispute, particularly where, as is the usual case in the 
Army, the laboratory report is the product of a forensic laboratory 
operated by a law enforcement agency. Recognizing that such 
reports are subject to attack 9n an individual basis, the court has 
allowed the defendant to attack the report's accuracy,305 both in 
terms of the analyst's competence and the regularity of the test 
procedures.306 Later cases have accepted this doctrineao7 and the 
Military Rules of Evidence expressly declare laboratory reports to 
be a hearsay exception. 3°8 A question not yet addressed, however, is 
300Fed. R. Evid. 803(8), Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 311 (citations omitted). 
The assumption, though, does not extend to the person who makes a report to the 
official or agency. See Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 579. 
301See Comment, 30 La. L. Rev. 651, 668 (1970). 
302E.g., United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69 (C. M.A. 1980); United States v. Strang-
stalien, 7 M.J. 225(C.M.A.1979); United States v. Miller, 23 C. M.A. 247,49 C.M.R. 380 
(C.M.A. 1974); United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 45 C.M.R. 353 (C.M.A. 1972). 
3°3Id. Contra United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.1977). See United States v. 
Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1978); State v. Henderson, 554 S.W. 2d 117 (Tenn.1977). 
3°4United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A at 582, 45 C.M.R. at 356. See United States v. 
Hernadez-Rojas, 617 F.2d 533 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789 
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1978); Saltzburg & 
Redden, supra note 291, at 612; English, Should Laboratory Reports Be Admitted at 
Courts-Martial to Identify Illegal Drugs?, The Army Lawyer, May 1978, at 25, 30. 
3osunited States v. Miller, 23 C.M.A. 247, 49 C.M.R. 380 (1974); United States v. 
Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 45 C.M.R. 353 (1972). 
306 As one writer has noted, the analyst's testimony will be of little use in most 
instances. English, supra note 304, at 31. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96 
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
301See, e.g., United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v. 
Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225 (C.M.A. 1979). The prosecution can avoid the laboratory 
report issue by stipulating to the identity of the substance tested or to the analyst's 
testimony or by deposing the chemist. In addition, the prosecution should inform the 
defense as soon as possible that the lab report will be offered into evidence and inquire 
if the defense desires the analyst's presence at trial. English, supra note 304, at 33. 
3osMil. R. Evid. 803(6), (8)(c). 
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the degree to which a laboratory report may be used to present in 
summary form an expert opinion susceptible to disagreement. 
Although Military Rule of Evidence 803(6) expressly permits "busi-
ness records" to contain "opinions", it is by no means clear that the 
Rule is intended to permit circumvention of the expert testimony 
rules, liberal though they are. Although current civilian law is 
sparse and confused, there may be a trend to admit records of regu-
larly conducted activity containing expert opinion and to leave to the 
trial judge the discretion to rule the evidence inadmissible when, 
pursuant to Rule 803(6), "the course of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness."309 
Inasmuch as Rule 803( 6) states tha laboratory reports are "normally" 
admissible under the Rule, this approach, for example, would clearly 
permit the military judge to exclude a report which utilized a con-
troversial scientific test. 
Assuming that the laboratory exception is sufficiently "reliable" to 
satisfy the confrontation clause, the remaining problem is what 
showing must be made to obtain the testimony of the chemist.310 
(c). Statements against interest 
Statements against interest, notably confessions in criminal cases, 
are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. 311 Admissibility is 
premised on the fact that the statement would tend "to subject [the 
declarant] to civil or criminal liability" in such a fashion that a 
reasonable person would not make the statement unless he or she 
thought it to be true.312 The assumption that people do not make 
disserving statements unless they are true underlies the exception sis 
and this assumption appears to ordinarily establish "indicia of relia-
bility" for confrontation purposes.314 Particular concern for reliabil-
ity accompanies the offer of a third party's confession to exculpate 
the defendant. To obviate the danger of fabrication, the Federal and 
309See, e.g., United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. 
Oates, 562 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.1977); but see Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.2d 1033 
(9th Cir. 1981). Some courts have required expert opinions expressed in business 
records to conform to the expert testimony rules generally, see, e.g., id., while others do 
not address this issue. See, e.g., Gardnerv. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 675 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 
1982). 
3lOSee text accompanying notes 469-92 infra. 
3
"Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). This assumes that Military Rules of Evidence 306 is not 
applicable. 
312MiJ. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). 
3l3Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 327. 
314See also United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d (5th Cir. 1978). 
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Military Rules of Evidence require corroborating evidence to "clearly 
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."315 If the confession 
includes statements implicating the accused, under general princi-
ples, the statements may be admissible as contextual statements.316 
Yet, there is some uneasiness in "identifying all third-party confes-
sions implicating a defendant as legitimate declarations against 
penal interest."317 A declarant's inculpatory statement made to the 
authorities which implicates the accused may be the result of a desire 
to improve the declarant's position in plea bargaining or a similar 
motive.318 While the statement implicating the accused would then 
be self-serving and should be excluded as not against the declarant's 
interest,319 a similar statement made to an accomplice could easily 
qualify as one falling under the hearsay exception.320 Thus, any 
confrontation issue depends directly on the circumstances surround-
ing the declarant's confession.321 
Arguably, the use of a co-defendant's confession violates the ra-
tionale of Bruton v. United States,322 which held that use at a joint 
trial of co-defendant A's confession which implicates co-defendant B, 
315Fed. R. Evid. 804(b )(3); Mil. R. Evid. 804(b )(3). See McCormick, Evidence§ 278, at 
84 (2d ed. Supp. 1978). 
3lGJd. at§ 279, at 675-76 (2d ed. 1972). See also United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244 
(1st Cir. 1976) (contextual statements admissible if neutral in interest and giving 
meaning to statement). 
317United States v. McConnico, 7 M.J. 302, 308 (C.M.A. 1979) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 
804(b), Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 328). Accord United States v. Sarmiento-
Perez, 633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. White, 553 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 
1977). 
318United States v. McConnico, 7 M.J. at 308. See Confrontation and Compulsory 
Process, supra note 232, at 600 n.98. 
319Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. at 328. See Parker v. 
Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 85-86 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bruton v. United States 
391 U.S. 123, 141-42 (1968) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d 
254 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1979); United States 
v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978). But see United State v. McConnico, 7 M.J. 302, 
308 (C.M.A. 1979) (no reason to exclude when confession offered solely to establish 
commission of crime by principal, confession was voluntary, and declarant refused to 
testify because of privilege against self-incrimination). 
azosee McCormick, supra note 315, at § 278, at 83-84; Fed. R. Evid. 804(b), Adv. 
Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. at 328. Cj. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)(co-conspirator 
exception). But see, e.g., United States v. Pena, 527 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1976) (no 
declaration when declarant may not have believed he was confessing to crime). 
321See United States v. McConnico, 7 M.J. 302,309 (C.M.A. 1979). Obviously, if the 
co-defendant takes the stand, no problem exists inasmuch as the exception is premised 
on the declarant's unavailability. See Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); Mil. R. 
Evid. 306; 76 Dick L. Rev. 354 (1972). See also United States v. Perner, 14 M.J. 181 
(C.M.A. 1982). 
322391 u.s. 123 (1968). 
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but which is not admissible against B, violates B's confrontation 
right and that limiting instructions are inadequate to protect B.323 
The confession strengthens the government's case by evidence that 
the co-defendant B cannot test by cross-examination, and the evi-
dence is equally damaging whether it proves the fact of the commis-
sion of the crime or the identity of the defendant as perpetrator. 324 
The declarant's confession will often be as inconsistent with the 
defense, even if it does not explicitly refer to the defendant or of 
anyone else, as if it clearly named the defendant; the confession can 
factually contradict the defense's theory, or the facts can be such that 
both the declarant and the defendant are probably guilty if either 
is.325 The Court of Military Appeals has avoided the issue in light of 
the differing opinions of the Supreme Court, preferring to decide the 
question by assuming a violation of the confrontation clause and then 
deciding the error war harmless. 326 
3. The Right to Cross-Examine the Government's Witnesses at Trial 
a. In General 
While the Sixth Amendment constitutionalizes the state's duty to 
disclose its evidence to the accused at trial and, to some degree, a duty 
to present its evidence in the best available form,327 it also protects 
the accused's interest in cross-examining opposing witnesses. In 
Smith v. Illinois, 328 the defendant was prevented from cross-examin-
ing a prosecution witness about his real name and address, appar-
ently because the information was deemed irrelevant and thus 
beyond the scope of cross-examination. Reversing the conviction, the 
Supreme Court held that the permissible scope of defense cross-
examination of a prosecution witness is measured by independent 
constitutional standards.329 Smith reflects the concept that, when 
applicable, the right to confrontation pre-empts the normal rules of 
evidence. 330 
322Butsee Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62(1979) (Bruton not applicable to interlock-
ing confessions of multiple defendants with proper limiting instructions). 
324See United States v. McConnico, 7 M.J. 302, 315-16 (C.M.A. 1979) (Perry, J., 
dissenting). But see id. at 309-10. Cf. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. at 72-73 (co-
defendant confession less prejudicial when defendant has confessed also). 
325 A. Amsterdam, Trial Manual for the Defense of Criminal Cases 1-273,-359 to -360 
(3d ed. 1975). 
326United States v. McConnico, 7 M.J. at 309-10. 
321See text accompanying notes 248-326 supra. 
328390 u.s. 129 (1968). 
322Jd. at 132-33. 
330See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931); United States v. Jacoby, 11 
C.M.A. 428, 432, 29 C.M.R. 244, 248 (1960); United States v. Speer, 2 M.J. 1244 
(A.F.C.M.R. 1976). 
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The Court has demonstrated that the constitutional standard in 
this context is strict. In Davis v. Alaska,331 an important state 
witness was a juvenile on juvenile court probation. Relying on a state 
law designed to protect the confidentiality of juvenile court records, 
the trial judge precluded defense cross-examination relating to the 
witness' juvenile record and his possible bias. Even though the state 
had an "important interest" in creating a privilege for juvenile 
records, 332 the Court held that the defendant's right of confrontation 
outweighed the state's interest. Davis suggests that the defendant's 
right of cross-examination can be defeated, if at all, only for the most 
compelling reasons.333 Although the Court's opinions in this area, 
strictly construed, indicate only that the defense must be permitted 
to show the bias of a hostile witness,334 it is apparent that they stand 
for the proposition that the accused must be permitted a meaningful 
cross-examination of a witness despite local rules of evidence.335 
Cross-examination serves three main functions: it sheds light on 
the credibility of the direct testimony; it brings out additional facts 
related to those elicited on direct examination; and in jurisdictions 
allowing "wide open" cross-examination,336 it brings out any addi-
tional facts tending to elucidate any issue in the case.337 While the 
standard of relevancy applied to direct testimony can be logically 
331415 u.s. 308 (1974). 
332/d. at 319. 
333 Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 581. Davis also implies 
that cross-examination for impeachment purposes is more favored in confrontation 
analysis. See United States v. Saylor, 6 M.J. 647 (N.C.M.R. 1978); United States v. 
Streeter, 22 C.M.R. 363 (A.B.R. 1956); Fed. R. Evid. 611(b); Mil. R. Evid. 61l(b); 
McCormick, supra note 315, at§ 29, at 58 (2d ed. 1972). When the witness refuses to 
answer on cross-examination, then "the accused's usual remedy for this denial of his 
right to confront an adverse witness is to have that witness' direct testimony stricken 
from the record." United States v. Rivas, 3 M.J. 282, 285 (C.M.A. 1977) (footnote 
omitted). See also Mil. R. Evid. 301{f)(2); United States v. Demchak, 545 F.2d 1029 
(5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Vandermark, 14 M.J. 690 (N.M.C.M.R. 1982). The 
remedy must be requested by the defense and is invariably granted unless the refusal 
applies only to "collateral" matters. United States v. Hornbrook, 14 M.J. 663 
(A.C.M.R. 1982); United States v. Lawless, 13 M.J. 943 (A.F.C.M.R.1982). However, 
the military judge has no duty to strike, sua sponte, the direct testimony in order to 
insure the basic fairness of the court-martial when the direct testimony is not per se 
inadmissible. Rivas, 3 M.J. at 286. 
334Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931). 
335See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 320, in which the Court states that the state's 
policy in protecting juvenile offenders' records "cannot require yielding of so vital a 
constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness." 
336McCormick, supra note 315, at§ 21, at 47 (2d ed. 1972). 
337 !d. at§ 29, at 57. See also E. Imwinkelreid, P. Giannelli, F. Gilligan & F. Lederer, 
Criminal Evidence 11-12 (1979). The armed forces is not a "wide open" jurisdiction, as 
cross-examination is restricted to the scope of the direct. Mil. R. Evid. 61l(b). 
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applied to facts elicited on cross-examination for use on the merits, 338 
the standard is markedly different for facts obtained to evaluate the 
credibility of evidence given during direct examination. In that 
instance, the test is "whether it will to a useful extent aid the court or 
jury in appraising the credibility of the witness and assessing the 
probative value of the direct testimony."339 Questioning for this pur-
pose takes various forms, and the criteria of relevancy are vague. 
Close adherence to a fixed standard may limit the usefulness of the 
cross-examination, but the dangers of undue prejudice and excessive 
consumption of time clearly lurk in the background.34° Clearly, evi-
dence which is irrelevant cannot invoke the confrontation clause. 
However, it is probable that evidence which is technically relevant to 
impeachment might not have the degree of probative value of impor-
tance necessary to make the clause applicable. 
b. The rape shield rule 
(1). In general 
In one situation in particular, that of sexual assault cases, poten-
tially relevant cross-examination has been restricted by the Military 
Rules of Evidence. When the issue of consent is raised in a forcible 
rape case, evidence of the character trait of the victim has generally 
been considered relevant.341 In reaction to political pressure from 
women's rights organizations and law enforcement agencies, 342 how-
ever, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions now limit the rele-
vance of the past sexual behavior of a victim of a forcible sexual 
offense.343 The military approach, codified in Military Rule of Evi-
dence 412, substantially follows Federal Rule of Evidence 412.344 
Subdivision (a} expressly declares that, in any case in which the 
defendant is charged with a "nonconsensual sexual offense,"345 the 
court-martial cannot admit into evidence reputation or opinion evi-
338McCormick, supra note 315, at § 29, at 58. 
339/d. 
340Thus, the trial judge has the power to control the extent of cross-examination. 
Fed. R. Evid. 611(a); Mil. R. Evid. 611(a). 
341McCormick, supra note 315, at§ 193, at 59. 
34223 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence § 5382, at 
492-531 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Wright & Graham]. 
343
"[A]lmost every jurisdiction in this country has enacted some sort of rape shield 
law." R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence 636 (2d. ed. 1983). 
344Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, Analysis of 
Mil. R. Evid. 412, reprinted at MCM, 1969 A18-65. The military rule is somewhat 
broader than the civilian rule in that it applies to any "non consensual sexual offense." 
Mil. R. Evid. 412(a). 
34Sillustratwns of included offenses are listed in Mil. R. ~vid. 412(e). 
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dence concerning the past sexual behavior346 of an alleged victim.347 
Subdivision (b) precludes admission of the victim's past sexual 
behavior unless the evidence is constitutionally required or offered to 
show: 
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, 
offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the 
accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim, 
the course of semen or injury; or 
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the 
accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim con-
sented to the sexual behavior with respect to which the 
nonconsensual sexual offense is alleged.348 
Noteably, Rule 412(a), unlike Rule 412(b), does not provide in its text 
for admission of evidence that is constitutionally required by other-
wise prohibited by the Rule. The drafters of the Rule, however, 
declared in their Analysis that "evidence that is constitutionally 
required to be admitted on behalf of the defense remains admissible 
notwithstanding the absence of express authorization in Rule 
412(a)."349 
(2). Potential confrontation problems 
Rape shield laws, including Military Rule of Evidence 412, have 
generally been upheld against claims that they violate the right of 
confrontation.350 Nevertheless, the rule's application in a particular 
case may violate the defendant's right to cross-examine a prosecution 
witness. 351 
Rule 412(a)'s seemingly absolute prohibition on reputation or opin-
ion evidence may run afoul of the confrontation clause in a number of 
circumstances. The accused might, for example, wish to offer evi-
dence of the victim's reputation for certain sexual practices in order 
346"Past sexual behavior" is defined in Mil. R. Evid. 412(d). See Wright & Graham, 
supra note 342, at§ 5384, at 538-48. 
347Mil. R. Evid. 412(a). Compare Mil. R. Evid. 405(a) (when character evidence is 
used circumstantially, only reputation or opinion evidence is admissible). Rule 412 
takes the opposite view, admitting only specific acts and limiting the circumstances in 
which that evidence is admissible. See Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 222. 
348See note 344, supra. 
349Mil. R. Evid. 412(b). 
350United States v. Hollimon, 12 M.J. 791, 793 (A.C.M.R. 1982); United States v. 
Mahone, 14 M.J. 521, 526 n.4 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982) (dicta). See generally cases cited in 
Annot., 1 A.L.R. 4th 283, 292-300 (1980); Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5387, 
at 571 n.53. 
351Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 
(1973). 
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to show that he acted in good faith and in accord with that reputation 
and thus did not intentionally use force or acted under a reasonable 
mistake of fact. 352 Professors Saltz burg and Redden suggest that the 
peculiar transient status of the armed forces353 presents another 
problem as defense witnesses may be unavailable and opinion or 
reputation evidence may be the only form of evidence available. 354 
The remainder of subdivision (b) of Rule 412 expressly provides 
that evidence constitutionally requires to be admitted shall be 
admitted despite the general prohibition on evidence of the sexual 
history of the victim. The problem is in determining when the con-
frontation clause will require such evidence. One possible situation 
may occur when the victim's sexual history is proffered to show a 
motive for fabricating a rape charge;355 the rape charge might be 
used by the victim to explain her pregnancy356 or, in the case of a 
minor, her all-night absence from home.357 Applying the Rule 
becomes more problematic in other contexts, such as impeachment 
by showing bias or specific contradiction. In a group rape case, the 
accused might claim, for example, that the victim's testimony has 
been influenced because she had previously had sexual relations 
with one of the rapists. Conversely, a witness who corroborates part 
of the victim's story might be biased because he or she is her lover or, 
at the least, has previously had sexual relations with the victim. 358 
Davis v. Alaska359 may be little help in such a case as Davis could be 
read as allowing cross-examination to establish that the witness has 
a reason to accuse someone, but without showing that the witness has 
a particular bais for accusing the defendant. 360 
352See Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 222. 
353Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 103 (2d ed. Supp. 1981). 
354Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 222. See also United States v. Elvine, 16 
M.J. 14, 18 (C.M.A. 1983). 
355United States v. Dorsey, 16 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v. Colon-
Angueira,16 M.J. 20 (C.M.A.1983); United States v. Ferguson,14 M.J. 840 (A.C.M.R. 
1982); State v. DeLawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 (1975); State v. Jalo, 27 Or. 
App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976). In Ferguson, the Court of Review held that evidenceof 
the victim's past sexual history, coupled with the testimony of a psychiatrist, should 
have been admitted to establish a motive for a false accusation of rape. The court's 
opinion reviews a number of cases dealing with the effect of the confrontation clause 
on rape shield rules and represents a useful resource to counsel faced with this issue. 
See also United States v. Elvine, 16 M.J. 14 (C. M.A. 1983) (inadequate offer of proof). 
356State v. DeLawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 (1975). 
357Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5387, at 574 n.73. 
358Id. at 576. 
359415 u.s. 308 (1974). 
360Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at § 5387, at 577. 
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It has been assumed that the accused has the right to contradict 
evidence of sexual behavior elicited by the prosecution, such as evi-
dence that, prior to the incident, the victim was a virgin. 361 This view 
assumes too much; Rule 412 bars such evidence whoever introduces 
it and ordinarily the accused has no right to compound the error.362 
On the other hand, evidence of prior sexual behavior may be relevant 
to rebut testimony not inadmissible itself under Rule 412.363 
The victim's credibility is also challengeable by showing some 
defect in her ability to perceive, recall, or narrate.364 Such defects 
may implicitly involve proof of prior sexual behavior, such as mental 
defects caused by tertiary syphilis. 365 In some cases, admission of the 
evidence may be required under the confrontation clause.366 
Impeaching the victim by introducing evidence by false accusa-
tions has not received much attention. Under the terms of Rule 412, 
this is not "past sexual behavior."367 Admission would seem to be 
limited by Military Rule of Evidence 608, which limits impeachment 
by specific acts to inquiry on cross-examination and subjects it to the 
court's discretion.368 Notwithstanding the strictures of Rule 608, an 
accused's constitutional right to cross-examine in this instance 
includes the right to introduce evidence of previous false accusa-
tions.369 
361Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5387, at fi77. 
362ld. at 581. The commentators contradict themselves at this point, saying first that 
admission of impeachment or rebuttal evidence may be constitutionally required, and 
then that impeachment by specific contradiction need not be permitted under Rule 
412(b )(1). Compare Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5386, at 562-63 with id. at 
§ 5387, at 576-77. Impeachment through bias appears to be allowed, however. Waiver 
may be inapplicable here because the Rule is intended in part to protect the victim who 
is not a party to the case. Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir. 1981). 
363For example, to counter a claim that the rape has left the victim debilitated, 
evidence that she later engaged in strenuous sexual activity might be profferred. 
When the victim denies a bias against the accused, episodes of lesbian activities 
might be submitted as contradiction. Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5387, at 
577 n.90. See id. at 581. Clearly, the exception suggestion here should be narrowly 
construed to prevent the exception from overwhelming the rule. 
364McCormick, supra note 315, at § 45, at 93. 
365Evidence of disease or physical condition, per se, are not rendered inadmissible by 
Mil. R. Evid. 412. 
366Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5387, at 577. But see People v. Nemie, 87 
Cal. App. 3d 926, 151 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1978) (evidence of victim's prior sexual history 
excluded on issue of her ability to perceive penetration). 
367Mil. R. Evid. 412(d). See also Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5384, at 
546-47. 
368MiJ. R. Evid. 608(b). 
369Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5387, at 580. A distinction should be made 
between accusations which are factually unfounded and cases which are dismissed. 
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Finally, the accused might wish to impeach the victim with evi-
dence of past convictions. While Rule 609 would appear to control the 
situation, admitting the conviction into evidence,370 the harder case 
arises when the impeachment is by convictions for past sex-related 
crimes, such as prostitution or obscenity. Rule 412 does not by its 
express language exclude such evidence for it is the fact of criminal 
conduct, the conviction, which is important. However, such evidence 
indirectly includes evidence of past sexual conduct. Though Davis v. 
Alaska3n may appear to require admission of the convictions, it may 
not be controlling; some courts have concluded that Davis only allows 
use of juvenile convictions for bias rather than for general impeach-
ment.372 Thus, a prostitution conviction might be used to show that 
the victim had a reason to accuse the defendant of rape, but not to 
merely impeach the victim's veracity. This issue is not likely to arise 
as these sexually related convictions are not likely to be probative of 
untruthfulness and thus neither admissible under Military Rules of 
Evidence 609(a) or 608(b) or Davis. 
c. Cross-examination during suppression hearings 
Though the accused's right to cross-examine is generally protected 
and can be abridged only for compelling reasons,373 a less stringent 
standard is used in suppression hearings, as suggested by M,cCrayv. 
Illinois. 374 The Supreme Court in McCray held that the confrontation 
clause was not violated when the judge hearing the suppression 
motion refused to allow defense cross-examination directed toward 
obtaining the name and address of the informant alleged to have 
provided probable cause for the arrest. Lower courts have extended 
McCray to situations in which valid security interests necessitate 
receiving in camera government evidence proffered at the suppres-
sion hearing.375 In such instances, however, a "least restrictive alter-
native" approach is used; confrontation is limited only to the extent 
370Mil. R. Evid. 609(a). The military judge's discretion to exclude the evidence is not 
applicable since exclusion is warranted only if the probative value of the conviction is 
less than "its prejudicial effect to the accused." Mil. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). Such evidence 
is hardly prejudicial to the accused but is only of concern to the victim. 
371415 u.s. 308 (1974). 
372E.g., People v. Conyers, 86 Misc. 2d 754, 382 N. Y.S. 2d 437 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 
1976); State v. Blirr, 18 Or. App. 494, 525 P.2d 1067 (1974). Contra State v. Cox, 42 
Ohio St. 2d 200, 327 N.E. 2d 639 (1975). 
313See text accompanying notes 18-340 supra. 
374386 u.s. 300 (1967). 
315E.g., United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972) (when government intro-
duced hijacker detection profile, the defendant was excluded, but defense counsel was 
allowed to cross-examine). C! Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 439 (1979) 
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necessary to protect the vaiid government interest. 376 While the court 
may restrict cross-examination to avoid "backdoor" discovery by the 
defense, it may not limit questioning that is clearly relevant to the 
defense claim. 377 
C. THE RIGHT OF COMPULSORY PROCESS 
1. The right to compel the attendance of available witnesses at trial 
a. In general 
MSPAGE52 
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the accused has the 
same ability as the prosecution to secure "witnesses and other evi-
dence."378 The statutory provision implements the defendant's right 
of compulsory process under the Sixth Amendment.379 Compulsory 
process, at the least, means that the defendant is entitled to use the 
government's subpoena power in order to compel the attendance of 
witnesses on behalf of the defense. In addition, the clause stands as an 
independent standard, doing more than incorporating by reference 
whatever subpoena rights the defendant has under statute.380 As 
such, the defendant's right of compulsory process goes beyond the 
subpoena power and includes not only writs of attachment and writs 
of habeas corpus ad testijicandum,381 but noncoercive devices for 
requesting and inducing the appearance of witnesses, such as the 
good faith power of the prosecution and the convening authority to 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (exclusion of public); United 
States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116 (C.M.A. 1977) (same); United States v. Arroyo-Angulo, 
580 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1978) (some defendants and counsel excluded from selected 
pretrial proceedings upon request of other defendants who were informants). These 
incidents can also be analyzed in terms of the government's privilege to withhold 
classified or sensitive information or the identity of an informant. See Mil. R. Evid. 
505(i), 506(i), 507(d) (in camera hearings to determine extent of disclosure). See also 
Wellington, In Camera Hearings and the Informant Identity Privilege Under Military 
Rule of Evidence 507, The Army Lawyer, Feb. 1983, at 9. 
376United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973). 
377Hill v. United States, 418 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
37sU.C.M.J. art. 46. 
379United States v. Davison, 4 M.J. 702, 704 (A.C.M.R. 1977). 
3S0Wigmore believed otherwise, 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2191 (rev. ed. J. 
McNaughton 1961), but the courts have been reluctant to construe the clause so 
narrowly. See State exrel. Rudolph v. Ryan, 327 Mo. 728,38 S.W. 2d 717 (1931); State 
ex rel. Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or. 163, 269 P.2d 491 (1954). 
381See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968) (dictum); Johnson v. Johnson, 
375 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Mich. 197 4); Curran v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 259 (D. Del. 
1971) (denying petition on facts). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (1976) (authorizing 
writs of haLeas corpus ad testificandum and ad prosequendum). For the nature of 
military compulsory process, see text accompanying notes 18-20 supra. 
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ask a person to return as a witness.382 Witnesses within and outside 
the jurisdiction are encompassed by the right.383 
Though the compulsory process right is extensive, it is not abso-
lute. The government has no duty to search for witnesses whom it has 
no reasonable probability of discovering or producing. 384 Instead, as 
with the government's obligation to confront the accused with wit-
nesses against him, ass the government need only make a good faith 
effort to locate and product defense witnesses.386 The similarity 
should not be surprising in light of the common purpose of the 
confrontation clause and the compulsory process clause to secure 
"the attendance of witnesses in order to enhance the ability of a 
defendant to elicit and present testimony in his defense."387 The 
defense's right to witnesses extend only to "material witnesses".388 
Within the armed forces, the determination of materiality "is not 
susceptible to gradation. The testimony of a given witness either is or 
is not material to the proceeding at hand,"389 and "once materiality 
has been shown the Government must either produce the witness or 
abate the proceedings."39o Given the state of military criminal law, 
3S2Compare Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), with Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 
204 (1972). The results of the two cases can be seen as requiring the prosecution to use 
established procedures making it reasonably likely that the witness would be pro-
duced, but not requiring use offutile or improbable procedures. Westen, Compulsory 
Process II, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 191, 286-88 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Compulsory 
Process II). See also United States v. Davison, 4 M.J. 702, 705 (A.C.M.R. 1977) (Jones, 
S.J., concurring). 
383Compulsory Process II, supra note 382, at 281-98. This is not to say, however, that 
a court will necessarily have the statutory or inherent power to compel the attendance 
of a witness. See note 116 for the limitations on court-martial subpoena power when 
trial takes place in a foreign nation. 
384Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). Cj. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980); 
United States v. Killebrew, 9 M.J. 154, 161 (C.M.A. 1980). 
3S5See text accompanying notes 324-37. 
386Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 72 
(C.M.A. 1980) (Cook, J.); United States v. Davison, 4 M.J. 702, 705 (A.C.M.R. 1977) 
(Jones, S.J., concurring); United States v. Kilby, 3 M.J. 938, 944 (N.C.M.R.1977). Once 
the witness is found, the government cannot lose him. See United States v. Potter, 1 
M.J. 897 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976). Conversely, the defense must use reasonable diligence in 
obtaining evidence. E.g., United States v. Jones, 6 M.J. 770 (A.C.M.R. 1978); United 
States v. Onstad, 4 M.J. 661 (A.C.M.R. 1977); United States v. Marshall, 3 M.J. 1047, 
1049 n.2 (A.F.C.M.R. 1977); United States v. Carey, 1 M.J. 761 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975); 
United States v. Corley, 1 M.J. 584 (A.C.M.R.1975); United States v. Young, 49 C.M.R. 
133 (A.F.C.M.R. 1974). 
3S7Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 589. 
388CJ: United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 74 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). See generally text 
accompanying notes 48-58 supra. 
3S9United States v. Willis, 3 M.J. 94, 95 (C.M.A .. 1977). 
390United States v. Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384, 385-86 (C.M.A. 1976). Accord United 
States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239, 243 (C.M.A. 1977). There is no constitutional right to 
introduce irrelevant or immaterial evidence. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 
(1967); Williams, 3 M.J. at 242. 
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the only significant compulsory process problem is the requirement 
found in paragraph 115 of the Manual for Courts-Manual that a 
request for defense witnesses be submitted to the trial counsel with 
adequate justification previously discussed. The compulsory process 
clause, has, however, importance beyond its basic ambit for it would 
appear to not only provide the defense with its fundamental right to 
obtain defense witnesses but also to provide the defense with the 
authority to obtain and present important defense evidence notwith-
standing usual procedural and evidentiary rules.391 
b. Requiring the government to grant immunity to prospective 
defense witnesses 
Under current law, the defense has a constitutional right to obtain 
available material defense witnesses. A particular problem is posed 
when the only reason that a witness will be unavailable is because 
the testimony of the witness would be self-incriminatory. Most such 
witnesses would refuse to testify against their interests voluntarily, 
of course, and the Fifth Amendment and Article 31 privileges 
against self-incrimination would prohibit the defense from calling 
them involuntarily. When the prosecution has a similar problem, it 
has the power to grant immunity to the witness392 which grant 
deprives the witness of any valid constitutional objection to testify-
ing.393 Although the prosecution could grant immunity to defense 
witnesses in order to enable them to testify, it almost without fail will 
refuse to do so voluntarily. Prosecutors will point out that bestowal of 
immunity complicates or makes impossible subsequent prosecution 
of the witness, 394 that there is no way in which to adequately insure in 
advance that the witness's testimony is material, and that immuniz-
ing defense witnesses would interfere with prosecutorial discretion 
and run the risk of immunizing large "fish" in order to prosecute 
"small fry". All of these concerns are valid. It may be, however, that 
the defense may be able to make an adequate offer of proof as to the 
39llnsorfar as the potential conflict between the defense's need for evidence and the 
shielding effect of evidentiary privileges, see Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 
73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 159-77 (1974). See also text accompanying notes 161-221 supra. 
393Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). 
394The prosecution could grant the accused use immunity, Kastigarv. United States, 
406 U.S. 441 (1972); Mil. R. Evid. 301(c)(1), under which nothing the witness said, or 
any product thereof, could later be used against the witness. However, military law 
takes an unusually expansive view of the derivative evidence rule and it would be very 
difficult for the prosecution to adequately prove in court that a case against an 
immunized witness was actually prepared and tried without use of the immunized 
testimony. United States v. Rivera, 23 C.M.A. 430, 50 C.M.R. 389, 1 M.J. 50 (1975). 
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anticipated testimony of the witness.395 Further, prosecutorial dis-
cretion is in the control of the government. If the prospective defense 
witness·is a more culpable offender than the accused, the govern-
ment should not be heard to complain that its own election of how to 
proceed has caused it eventual difficulties. In short, in an approp-
riate case, the defense's right to the testimony of a material witness 
should outweigh the government's interest in not bestowing use 
immunity on the witness.396 Thus far, however, the courts have been 
extremely reluctant to compel the government to grant immunity to 
defense witnesses.397 Within the armed forces, the ultimate resolu-
tion of this issue is unclear. With a majority of the three member 
395 A procedure may exist, at least in civilian life, to cope with the situation in which 
the defense may demonstrate a reasonable belief that the witness has material testi-
mony but is unable to actually demonstrate the existence of the testimony. Arguably 
a judge can grant the witness use immunity for purposes of an in camera 
hearing out of the presence of the prosecutor, in order to determine 
whether the witness possesse exculpatory evidence. If the testimony is 
material, the court can then force the prosecution to choose between 
allowing the witness to testify in open court under a grant of use immun-
ity or withholding immunity and thus foregoing prosecution. If the wit-
ness' evidence is immaterial, the judge can then seal the in camera 
testimony, thereby protecting the witness from self-incrimination while 
sparing the prosecution the burden of attempting to trace any further 
evidence against the witness to independent sources. 
Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 581-82 n.38 (citing United 
States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1047n.7 (5th Cir.1976)). Professor Westen 
questions the ability of the court to prevent disclosure to the prosecution. Id, but if 
evidence allegedly privileged against disclosure to the defense can be protected, see 
Mil. R. Evid. 505-07, the legality of which may be suspel't in~nfar as ex varte in camera 
proceedings are concerned, there seems to be no reason why disclosure to the prosecu-
tion is any more probable. The issue is further complicated by the fact that, usually, 
immunity is granted by the convening authority rather than the military judge in the 
armed forces. Thus, the intermediate use of immunity would normally need command 
cooperation and it is not likely that a trial judge would threaten dismissal of charges if 
the convening authority failed to grant such immunity with the potential evidence 
being so speculative. 
396See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980); 
United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976); State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App. 
2d 17, 321 N.E. 2d 890 (1974). But the government's interest is established if the 
witness is a potential target of prosecution. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d 
Cir. 1980). The granting of immunity to the witness need not be the only possible 
remedy, however. In an appropriate case, the case might be continued until the 
witness's status is clarified, such as by conviction. But see United States v. Villines, 13 
M.J. 46 (C.M.A. 1982) (right against self-incrimination in contested case persists 
pending appeal). 
391See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 13 M.J. 407 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v. 
Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir.1978); United States v. Carmen, 577 F.2d 556 (9th Cir. 
1978). For cases discussing an asserted duty to grant defense witnesses immunity, see 
United States v. Villines, 13 M.J. 46 (C. M.A. 1982); United States v. Barham, 625 F.2d 
1221 (5th Cir. 1980); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 
1980); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir.1976); United States v. Alessio, 
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court sustaining a conviction in which a defense request that a 
defense witness be granted immunity was denied, the Court of Mil-
itary Appeals was badly divided on this issue in United States v. 
Villines,398 a decision consisting of an opinion by Judge Fletcher, 
with Judge Cook concurring in the result, and Chief Judge Everett 
dissenting. A synthesis of the three opinion suggests that a majority 
of the present court believes that immunity can be granted to enable 
defense witnesses to testify "when clearly exculpatory evidence is 
involved". Furthermore, the decision on such a defense request must 
be made without utilizing "an unjustifiable standard [or improper 
consideration] such as race, religion, or other arbitary classifica-
tion ... " and without the intent of making such a decision "with the 
deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process."399 
Rejecting the view of Chief Judge Everett that both the general 
court-martial convening authority and the military judge may grant 
immunity, Judges Fletcher and Cook appear to hold that only the 
convening authority has that power. Given the divided nature of the 
court in Villines, further litigation can be expected in this area. 
c. Improper joinder 
Joinder of accuseds is allowed under paragraph 26d and 33l of the 
Manual for Courts-Martial. The procedure creates several savings, 
notably time, expense, and prosecutorial effort.400 The Manual coun-
sels, however, that if "the testimony of an accomplice is necessary, he 
should not be tried jointly with those against whom he is expected to 
testify."401 From the accused's perspective, joinder may deny the 
defense the benefit of favorable testimony from a co-accused, either 
because the testimony would improperly prejudice the co-accused402 
528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lowell, 490 F. Supp. 897 (D.N.J. 1980); 
United States v. DePalma, 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See generally Note, The 
Case Against a Right to Defense Witness Immunity, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 139 (1983). 
Though there may be no constitutional obligation on the prosecution to grant immunity 
to defense witnesses, but see Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 
581 n.38, arguably, an obligation under Article 46 exists in order to effectuate the 
article's mandate of equal access to witnesses. But cf. United States v. Davison, 4 M.J. 
702, (A.C.M.R. 1977) (Art. 46 only implements Sixth Amendment rights). 
39813 M.J. 46 (C.M.A. 1982). 
399Jd. at 55. In United States v. Jones, 13 M.J. 407 (C. M.A. 1982), the court reJected a 
defense claim that it was entitled to have a defense witness immunized, stating that 
there was no "reasonably foreseeable testimony" beneficial to the defense. 
40°MCM, 1969, para. 26d; Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 
71, 141 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Compulsory Process]. 
4otMCM, 1969, para. 26d. 
402E.g., Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir.1970). 
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or because the co-accused refuses to testify. 403 The principal problem 
in such a case is determining if joinder is the real cause of the 
co-accused's silence. 404 Such claims for severance are usually treated 
with skepticism, especially in civilian courts. 405 The Manual for 
Courts-Martial, however, declares: "In a common trial, a motion to 
sever will be liberally considered"406 and states that one of the "more 
common grounds for this motion are that the mover desires to use at 
his trial the testimony of one or more of his co-accused .... "407 In light 
of the prosecution's obligation to avoid harassing or discouraging 
defense witnesses from testifying408 and the Manual's liberal stand-
ard, the accused should not be required to show to a certainty that 
joinder silenced the co-accused and, for example, if the accused 
shows that the co-accused has already given exculpatory testimony 
out-of-court and that joinder could silence the witness, the govern-
ment should be required to show that joinder would have no such 
effect.409 Severance should certainly be ordered whenever it is more 
probable than not that the co-accused will testify for the accused at a 
separate trial. 410 
2. The Right to be Present for the Testimony of Defense Witnesses at 
Trial 
There is little, if any, discussion in the case law on the extent of the 
accused's constitutional right to be present when defense witnesses 
testify as the government is "not in the habit of requiring defense 
witnesses to testify outside the defendant's presence."411 The issue 
403E.g., United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971). 
404Campulsory Process, supra note 400, at 142-43. 
405See United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Buma-
tay, 480 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Pelion, 475 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N. Y. 
1976), affdmem., 620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Stitt, 380 F. Supp.1172 
(W.D. Pa. 1974), affdmem., 510 F.2d 971 (3d Cir.1975); United States v. Sweig, 316 F. 
Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). But see MCM, 1969, para. 69d (military practice). 
406Jd. 
401Jd. 
4ossee text accompanying notes 460-68 infra. 
409Campulsory Process, supra note 400, at 143. See United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 
911 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Starr, 584 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1978); United 
States v. Smolar, 557 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Anthony, 565 F.2d 533 
(8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kozell, 468 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Pa. 1979); United 
Statesv. Aloi, 449 F. Supp. 698 (E.D.N.Y.l977); United States v. Iezzi, 451 F. Supp. 
1027 (W.D. Pa. 1976), affd. sub nom. United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 
1978); United States v. Buschmann, 386 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Wis. 1975), a!fd on other 
grounds, 527 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1976). 
410See United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Boscai, 
573 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Wofford, 562 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1977); 
United States v. Bumatay, 480 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir.1973); MCM, 1969, para. 69d(citing 
this as one of the "more common grounds" for severance). 
411Conjrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 589. 
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could arise nonetheless in the context of the presentation of classified 
information. In this instance, the accused's analogous right under 
the confrontation clause is relevant. The accused has the right to be 
present when government witnesses testify and the right can be 
defeated only when the accused voluntarily leaves the jurisdiction 
after arraignment or disrupts trial.412 The principle established 
under the confrontation clause applies with equal force in the context 
of the compulsory process clause. In each case, the accused's interests 
in being present are the same. During the prosecution's case-in-chief, 
the accused needs to know exactly what the government witnesses 
are saying in order to prepare the defense. When presenting the 
defense, the accused needs to know exactly what the defense wit-
nesses are saying so that he or she can better elicit testimony. As a 
result, the accused's interests should be infringed only when the 
accused forfeits the right413 or for a compelling government 
interest. 414 
It is not immediately apparent why the accused should be present 
to hear his or her own witnesses; preparation for trial should show in 
advance what defense witnesses will say. But preparation does not 
eliminate the possibility of surprise testimony; at best, preparation 
only gives an approximation of what a witness will say and turncoat 
witnesses are not unknown. To evaluate the impact of a witness, the 
accused needs to the exact substance of each witness' testimony.415 
Furthermore, though counsel is usually appointed now so as to have 
enough time to prepare, preparation assumes that a witness is 
friendly and can be located. Instead, not all witnesses are on friendly 
terms with the accused-the accomplice who turns state's evidence is 
the common example-and not all witness can be located in advance 
of trial. Defense witnesses then could be hostile in whole or part and 
might need to be impeached.416 
3. The Right to Examine Defense Witnesses at Trial and to Present 
Defense Evidence 
a. General constitutional standards 
The "most important question"417 under the compulsory process 
412See note 231 supra. 
413See Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra, note 232, at 573-75 n.18. 
414Id. at 589. 
415The cynic would ask then if the defendant will tell counsel. Cj. Y. Kamisar, W. 
LaFave &J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure 1618-19 (5th ed.1980) (unrealistic to 
expect attorney to consult with defendant on every trial decision). 
4!6Mil. R. Evid. 607. 
417Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 590. 
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clause is whether the defendant's right to compel attendance of 
witnesses at trial includes the right to introduce their testimony into 
evidence.418 Two theoretical possibilities exist: the Sixth Amend-
ment merely incorporates by reference the government's definition 
of "witness" as contained in rules on competency, relevancy, mate-
riality, and privilege or the Sixth Amendment establishes an inde-
pendent definition of "witness" based on its own standards on admis-
sion of defensive evidence. Obviously, arguments for both approaches 
exist and there is always a risk of making every evidence question in 
criminal cases a constitutional question. Wigmore's view was that 
the constitutional rule overrode state law only to guarantee the right 
to compel attendance of witnesses, but that the states could establish 
rules to govern admissibility of the evidence.419 On the other hand, if 
the government is free to determine who is a witness in the context of 
compulsory process, the purpose of the clause could be easily and 
completely frustrated.420 In Washington v. Texas, 421 the Supreme 
Court resolved the fundamental question by holding that compulsory 
process includes both the right to compel attendance of defense 
witnesses and the right to introduce their testimony into evidence. 
The Court's decision consisted of two parts. First, the witnesses the 
defendant may subpoena must be congruent with those allow(i!d to 
testify for the defendant. Otherwise, the defendant would only have 
the right to subpoena witnesses who could not be put on the stand or 
the right to call witnesses whom could not be subpoenaed; either 
right alone would be an empty one.422 Second, and of more signifi-
cance, it is constitutional law alone that ultimately determines 
whether testimony is admissible on behalf of the defendant. The 
framers were not content to rely on rules of evidence governing 
admissibility but intended to create a constitutional standard with 
which to judge those rules. 423 Washington also established the content 
of the constitutional standard. The state rule of evidence at issue424 
was invalid, not because it was discriminatory or irrational, 425 but 
because the government interest was inadequate to justify restrict-
ing the defendant's right to present evidence in his defense. 426 Admit-
418See generally Imwinkelried, Recent Developments: Chambers v." Mississippi-The 
Constitutional Right to Present Defense Evidence, 62 Mil. L. Rev. 225 (1973). 
4198 J .Wigmore, Evidence§ 2191, at 68-69 (rev. ed. J. McNaugton 1961). 
42°Conjrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 591. 
421388 u.s. 14 (1967). 
422/d. at 23. 
423/d. at 20, 22. 
424/d. at 16, 17 n.4. (Texas law made accomplices incompetent to testify for one 
another.) 
425But cf. id. at 22-23 (rule disqualifying alleged accomplice from testifying for 
defendant is absurd in light of exceptions to rule and sheer common sense). 
426See also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). 
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tedly, the state had an interest in excluding evidence which probably 
was false and self-serving. The Court instead weighed the relative 
interests of the state and the defendant and determined that, since 
the trier of fact could be trusted to adequately consider the evidence, 
the only course was to admit the evidence. 
There is some congruence between the Court's view of compulsory 
process expressed in Washington and its view of confrontation, as 
stated in Smithv. Illinois427 and Davisv. Alaska.428 In both Washing-
ton and Smith, the defendant was prevented by a state rule of evi-
dence from obtaining testimony from a witness who was present and 
ready to testify. Holding that the Sixth Amendment requires the 
trier of fact be allowed to give the evidence whatever weight and 
credibility may be appropriate, the Court in both instances over-
turned the evidentiary rule. Similarly, the presence of a legitimate 
state interest was raised to justify exclusion of evidence in Washing-
ton and Davis. Neither denying the importance of the asserted state 
interests nor challenging the value of the rules used to further those 
interests, the Court held in both cases that the defendant had a 
superior interest in presenting defense evidence. Implicit in Wash-
ington and Davis is that the defendant's rights under the Sixth 
Amendment are not absolute, but that questions of admissibility due 
to competence, materiality, or privilege concerns ultimately consti-
tute a federal question determined by strict constitutional stand-
ards.429 
b. Competency of witnesses 
As both Washington v. Texas430 and Chambers v. Mississippi431 
indicate, rules on competency of evidence may raise constitutional 
issues. Generally, though, the constitutional questions about compet-
ency have been reduced by the broad competency standard con-
tained in Military Rule of Evidence 601; unless provided otherwise, 
any person is competent to testify. 432 The only restrictions on compet-
ency are those prohibiting the military judge and court members 
427390 u.s. 129 (1968). 
428415 u.s. 308 (1974). 
429See Compulsory Process, supra note 400, at 159-77; Compulsory Process II, supra 
note 382, at 194-231. 
430388 u.s. 14 (1967). 
431410 u.s. 284 (1973). 
432The Analysis of the Rule states that its plain meaning would eliminate any 
judicial discretion in the area of competence. Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to the 
Manual for Courts-Martial, Analysis of Rule 601, reprinted at MCM, 1969, A18-85 to 
-86. Other traditional competency questions were also rendered obsolete by the Man-
ual revision. Hearsay, for example, is no longer incompetent. Mil. R. Evid. 801. 
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from testifying as witnesses. 433 
Under the military rule, a court member "may testify on the 
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improper-
ly brought to the attention of the members of the court-martial, 
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon 
any member, or whether there was unlawful command influence."434 
The Rule does not draw the line at the jury room door but between the 
mental processes of court members and the presence of conditions or 
events designed to improperly influence court members in or out of 
the jury room. The Rule thus distinguishes between subjective and 
objective events and prohibits testimony about conduct which has no 
verifiable objective manifestations.435 While the Rule correctly states 
existing law, 436 there is some suggestion that actual practice need not 
be so rigid.437 Going beyond the Rule requires consideration of the 
interests protected by the Rule, when and how the issue is raised, and 
the type of impropriety involved. There are two basic interests being 
furthered by the Rule. One is the protection of court members from 
probing by the defense to see if there was misconduct or improper 
procedure.438 The other interest involved is the need for finality in 
criminal convictions. If this type of inquiry were allowed, the verdict 
would be subject to constant attack. 
The issue of impropriety can be raised by "affidavit or evidence 
or any statement by the member" when the member could testify to 
the same effect. 439 The issue of impropriety should be raised before 
the court adjourns, if possible, and will usually be suggested in this 
situation by a member's statement to the judge, counsel, or bailiff. 440 
In addition, the problems that the Rule is designed to prevent "dis-
appear in large part if such investigation ... is made by the judge and 
takes place before the juror's discharge and separation."441 
The type of impropriety and its effect will also be important. A 
433Mil. R. Evid. 605(a), 606(a). 
434Mi1. R. Evid. 606(a). 
435See Mil. R. Evid. 606(b). 
436United States v. West, 23 C. M.A. 77, 48 C.M.R. 548 (1974); Analysis of the 1980 
Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, Analysis of Rule 606, reprinted at 
MCM, 1969, A18-87. 
437United States v. West, 23 C.M.A. at 81, 48 C.M.R. at 552 (Quinn, J., concurring). 
4313See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 369 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United 
States v. Miller, 403 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1968). Given the usual complexity of instruc-
tions, it would be easy to establish that the court members misunderstood or misap-
plied an instruction. 
439Mi1. R. Evid. 606(b). 
44°Compare Parkerv. Gladden, 385 U.S. at 366-67 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (petition-
er's wife asked individual jurors a series of questions sent to her by petitioner). 
4418 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 2350, at 691 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961). 
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juror cannot testify about improper quotient verdicts442 or about 
compromise verdicts.443 Court members may testify about prejudi-
cial information brought to their attention444 or outside influence 
on the family,445 or to irregularities as intoxication, bribery, and 
possession of information not obtained through trial.446 
c. Admissibility of evidence 
(1). In general 
Even though a witness is competent to testify, his or her testimony 
may be excluded on evidentiary grounds. Chambers v. Mississippi, 447 
a case susceptible to multiple interpretations, suggests that evidence 
rules cannot be applied to infringe the defendant's right to present a 
defense. In Chambers, the Supreme Court overturned a conviction 
because the defendant was not permitted to solicit declarations 
against penal interest-confessions to the crime made by a third 
party-because of state evidentiary law. The import of Chambers 
was, and remains, unclear. Some commentators have interpreted it 
as a unique case growing out of unusual facts and an unusual combi-
nation of state evidentiary principles. Others have interpreted it as a 
major, if not seminal, case providing the defense with a constitu-
tional right to present important probative evidence notwithstand-
ing normal evidentiary rules. Under this latter view, Chambers is 
both a confrontation and compulsory process case and thus one of 
great potential value. Although the Court of Military Appeals has 
followed Chambers,448 it has not clearly indicated which interpreta-
tion of Chambers it has accepted. Recently, however, the court has 
emphasized the need for the proffered evidence to at least be "relia-
ble" for Chambers to apply.449 Furthermore, the court appears to 
have placed some emphasis on the fact that the hearsay declarant in 
442McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915). 
443Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912). 
444Mattox v. United States,146 U.S.140 (1892); Bulger v. McCray, 575 F.2d 407 (2d 
Cir.1978). 
44SKrause v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977). 
4463 J. Weinstein v. M. Berger, Evidence para. 606 [or], at 609-29 to -32 nn.25-37 
(1981) (citing cases). 
447410 U.S. 284 (1973). Chambers is an unusual case. Justice Powell, its author, 
expressly limited its holding to "the facts and circumstances of this case .... " I d. at 
303. However, it is impossible to ignore the broader import of the case which seems 
clearly to be that the defense may present relevant and critical defense evidence 
notwithstanding state evidentiary rules to the contrary. See Imwinkelried, supra note 
418, for an outstanding examination of the case. Insofar as the effect of evidentiary 
privileges are concerned, see note 391 supra. 
448United States v. Johnson, 3 M.J. 143 (C. M.A. 1977). 
449United States v. Perner, 14 M.J. 181, 184 (C.M.A. 1982). 
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Chambers was available at trial, 450 suggesting that the court will 
limit Chambers to circumstances in which the declarant is present at 
trial although not subject to full cross-examination. 
{2). Scientific evidence 
Although Chambers has great potential scope, mainly in the hear-
say area, it may have particular value in the area of scientific evi-
dence, particularly in circumstances in which the defense desires to 
offer evidence of an exculpatory polygraph examination. Before 
scientific evidence is admitted, it must be shown to be relevant, i.e., to 
make the existence of any fact "more probable or less probable than 
it would be without the evidence."451 Traditionally, this meant for 
scientific evidence that the proponent had to establish that: 
(1) the underlying scientific principle is valid; 
(2) the technique properly applies the principle; 
(3) the instruments used were in proper working order; 
(4) proper procedures were used; and 
(5) the ·people conducting the test and interpreting the 
results were qualified.452 
This foundation met the authentication and relevancy requirements 
and was known as the Frye test. 453 Pursuant to this test, if the idea 
behind a scientific technique is invalid, evidence obtained through 
that technique is irrelevant.454 It is unclear, however, whether the 
Frye test was adopted by either the Federal or Military Rules of 
Evidence.455 The expansive nature of the expert witness rules found 
in the Federal and Military Rules of Evidence,456 coupled with the 
simple definition of relevancy in Rule 401 and the lack of any refer-
ence to the Frye test suggest strongly that the test has been aban-
45/Jfd. at 184 n.3. See also United States v. Johnson, 3 M.J. 143, 147-48 (C.M.A. 1977) 
(declarant, who had refused to testify pursuant to the right against self-incrimination 
was in the courtroom). 
451Mil. R. Evid. 401. 
452See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); United States v. Ford, 4 
C.M.A. 611, 16 C.M.R. 185 (1954). 
453See note 451 supra. 
454United States v. Hulen, 3 M.J. 275, 277 (C.M.A. 1977) (Perry, J., concurring); 
United States v. Helton, 10 M.J. 820, 823 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981); United States v. DeBen-
tham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972), affd, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1973). 
455Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 457; Analysis of Mil. R. 702. See generally 
Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer on 
Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 261, 265-67 
(1981) (collecting cases). 
456See generally Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial; 
Analysis of Rule 702, reprinted at MCM, 1969, A18-95-96. 
73 
HeinOnline  -- 101 Mil. L. Rev. 74 1983
MILITARY LAW ·REVIEW [VOL.lOl 
doned. Yet, the test has had such wide currency over the years, albeit 
often not followed, that absence of mention in the Rules may not 
equate to its abandonment. If the Frye test has not been abandoned, 
Chambers could be argued in any given case to prohibit its applica-
tion to prohibit defense evidence if it could be shown to be too rigor-
ous and to prohibit relevant and probative defense evidence. For the 
argument to succeed, the evidence must also be "legally relevant;" it 
must not be unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or unduly delaying.457 
Because the compulsory process right to prevent evidence extends 
only to relevant evidence, 458 there is no violation of the defendant's 
constitutional or statutory459 rights when necessary foundation 
requirements are not met and the evidence is not admitted as a 
result. 
d. Preventing defense witnesses from testifying 
The defendant's right to present evidence may be frustrated not 
only by evidentiary rules, but also by the actions of the prosecutor or 
the judge. The effect on the accused is the same whether a witness is 
prevented from testifying because of evidentiary rules or because of 
coercion. The compulsory process clause prohibits the government 
from deliberately harassing or removing witnesses. Legitimate 
procedures may be employed, e.g., advising a witness of the penalty 
for perjury or of the privilege against self-incrimination,460 thus 
suggesting that there is a fine line between proper and improper 
conduct. Some conduct, though, may be so flagrant as to violate the 
compulsory process clause.461 
The constitutional principle was recognized by the Supreme Court 
in a due process decision Webb v. Texas.462 While acknowledging the 
state's interest in preventing perjury, the Court overturned the con-
viction on due process grounds because the trial judge had used 
"unnecessarily strong terms" to warn the only defense witness about 
perjury and "effectively drove that witness off the stand."463 Webb 
thus establishes that a practice that effectively deters a material 
defense witness from testifying is invalid unless necessary to 
457Mil. R. Evid. 403. See United States v. Hulen, 3 M.J. 275, 277 (C.M.A.1977) (Cook, 
J.). See also United States v. Helton, 10 M.J. 820, 824 (A.F.C.M.R.1981); United States 
v. Hicks, 7 M.J. 561, 563,566 (A.C.M.R. 1979) (adopting opinion of Cook, J. in Hulen). 
4SSUnited States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239, 242 (C.M.A.1977); United States v. Carpen-
ter, 1 M.J. 384, 385 (C.M.A. 1976). 
459U.C.M.J., art. 46. 
460Mil. R. Evid. 301(b)(2). 
461See, e.g., United States v. Giermek, 3 M.J. 1013, 1016 (C.G.C.M.R. 1977). 
462409 U.S. 95 (1972) (though relying on a compulsory process case, Washington v. 
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)). 
463409 U.S. at 98. 
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accomplish a legitimate state interest. Webb only addressed the 
situation of judicial interference with the defendant's right to pre-
sent evidence.464 Other cases hold that harassment or other efforts 
designed to discourage defense witnesses also violate the defendant's 
rights. Such efforts have included perjury warnings and threats of 
prosecution or arrest.465 Although military cases support the propo-
sition that negligent discharge of a defense witness violates the 
government's duty to insure the attendance of the witness at trial, 466 
the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in United States v. Valenzuela461 
places that general statement in doubt. Concerned with the deporta-
tion of a potential witness, the Court held in Valenzuela that the 
statutory policy of rapid deportation of illegal aliens requires that 
the defendant make "a plausible showing that the testimony of the 
deported witnesses would have been material and favorable to his 
defense, in ways not merely cumulative to the testimony of available 
witnesses."46S Although the Court expressly stated, in what may soon 
be an oft-quoted footnote 9, that it expressed no opinion "on the 
showing which a criminal defendant must make in order to obtain 
compulsory process for securing the attendance ... of witnesses 
within the United States" and the holding may be limited to cases in 
which the desired witness has been deported, the case may be per-
suasive when the armed forces have properly discharged a service 
member, albeit with negligent timing. One can reasonably argue 
that the elimination of unfit members of the armed forces is neces-
sary to an effective armed force and that Congress has clearly recog-
nized this via its knowledge and recognition of the discharge system. 
If this should prove accurate, no sanction would be assessed against 
the government unless the lost testimony fit the test pronounced in 
Valenzuela. 
464Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in 
Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711, 848 (1976). See United States v. Cool, 409 U.S.100 
(1972); United States v. Sears, 20 C.M.A. 380, 384, 43 C.M.R. 220, 224 (1971); United 
States v. Giermek, 3 M.J. 1013, 1016 (C.G.C.M.R. 1977); United States v. Staton, 48 
C.M.R. 250, 254 (A.C.M.R. 1974); United States v. Snead, 45 C.M.R. 382, 385 
(A.C.M.R. 1972). See also United States v. Phaneuf, 10 M.J. 831 (A.C.M.R. 1981). 
465See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1973). 
466See United States v. Potter, 1 M.J. 897 (A.F.C.M.R.1976) (negligent discharge of 
defense witness violates government's duty to insure witness' pressure at trial). See 
also Singleton v. Lefkowitz, 583 F.2d 618(2d Cir.1978). The defendantmustshow that 
the alleged conduct did in fact cause the witness not to testify or to change his or her 
testimony. Once the defendant has made a prima facie case of harassment, the 
prosecution has the burden of demonstrating the contrary. United States v. Morrison, 
535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Thompson, 5 M.J. 28 (C.M.A. 1978); 
United States v. Kennedy, 8 C.M.A. 251, 24 C.M.R. 61 (C.M.A. 1957). 
46773 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). 
468/d. at 1206. 
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e. Laboratory reports 
In the military, one of the most troublesome issues raised in a 
compulsory process analysis is the right to challenge admission of 
laboratory reports. The reports are clearly admissible under the 
hearsay exception for records of regularly conducted activity, 469 but, 
assuming the report is admitted under a hearsay exception, the 
question then becomes whether the defense can present evidence to 
impeach the report. Commonly, this impeachment is directed 
toward the competency of the analyst involved and the procedures 
used in the test.470 The Court of Military Appeals has concluded that 
the defendant has the right "to call the analyst under appropriate 
circumstances" for this purpose. 471 While the right is uncontro-
verted, the mechanics involved cause considerable problems. 
Generally, a defense request for the analyst must comply with the 
procedures established under paragraph 115aofthe Manual, includ-
ing the implied prerequisites of timeliness and materiality.472 There 
is no consensus, however, on the exact standards required in this 
situation. The problem stems from the peculiar nature of the testi-
mony involved. The analyst's statements are used against the 
defendant at trial and the analyst actually is a witness for the 
government even if he or she does not personally appear.m Thus, 
when the defense calls the analyst, defense counsel may have diffi-
culties interviewing this witness. 474 If a pretrial interview cannot be 
469United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 70 (C.M.A. 1980) (Cook, J.); United States v. 
Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225, 229 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 
45 C.M.R. 353, 355-56 (1972); Mil. R. Evid. 803(6), (8)(B); Analysis of the 1980 
Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, Analysis of Rule 803(6), reprinted at 
MCM, 1969, A18-104. See United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613,622 (9th Cir.1979) 
(Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)). See also United States v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908, 910 (D.C. Cir. 
1980); United States v. Hernandez-Rojas, 617 F.2d 533, 534 (9th Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Orozco, 590 
F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1979); Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 570. Contra 
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 66-68 (2d Cir. 1977). See Imwinkelreid, The 
Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative Laboratory Reports Against Criminal 
Defendants, 30 Hastings L.J. 621 (1979). 
470See Imwinkelreid, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer 
on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 261 (1981) 
(arguing that increasing rejection of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 
1923), necessitates attacking the weight of scientific evidence of its admissibility). 
471United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 72 (C.M.A. 1980) (Cook, J.); United States v. 
Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225, 229 (C.M.A. 1979) (Fletcher, C.J.). 
472See text accompanying notes 42-47, 48-58 supra. 
473United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69,80-81 (C.M.A.1980) (Fletcher, J., concurring 
in result) (citing Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 604 & n. 
105). 
474See United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69,77 (C.M.A. 1980) (Everett, C.J., concur-
ring in result) (implied in analysis of MCM, 1969, para. 115a); Mil. R. Evid. 806. 
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accomplished, the defense may not have enough information with 
which to establish the materiality and necessity of the analyst's 
personal testimony.475 At this point, the judges on the Court of Mil-
itary Appeals apply different standards of materiality, and implic-
itly, standards of compliance with paragraph 115. Judge Fletcher 
ance.476 Apparently, no formal request would be needed, and the 
defense would not be required to expressly show materiality or 
necessity. 477 This view assumes that cross-examination of the analyst 
is always material and necessary because it detracts from the weight 
given to the evidence of the laboratory report. 478 Judge Cook, on the 
other hand, believes that compliance with the usual standards is 
appropriate. The government must produce a witness only upon the 
defendant's showing of materiality and necessity479 and this stand-
ard is no different for laboratory reports.4so To hold that a mere 
unsupported request triggers the obligation to obtain the witness 
would nullify the purpose of the hearsay exception. 481 The accused's 
right to call the chemist is thus qualified by the normal standards of 
materiality and it would appear-that, in Judge Cook's view, the 
defense counsel must attempt to contact the analyst before trial and 
submit a request as for any other witness.482 Chief Judge Everett 
appears to take the middle ground. Recognizing that paragraph 
115a serves legitimate government interests, he would require the 
defense to follow the paragraph's procedure, 483 but "rigid application 
475United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77-78 (C.M.A.1980) (Everett, C.J., concurring 
in result). 
476United States v. Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225,229 (C.M.A.1980). See United States v. 
Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 81 (C.M.A. 1980) (Fletcher, J., concurring in result). 
477/d. at 80. 
47BSee id. at 82. (C. M.A. 1980) (citing Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra 
note 232, at 619 n.143); Imwinkelreid, supra note 470. 
mE.g., United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239, 243 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. 
Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384, 385-86 (C. M.A. 1976). In United States v. Davis, 14 M.J. 847 
(A.C.M.R. 1982), the court held that failure to order a chemist produced was reversi-
ble error. In Davis, the court interpreted Vietor as requiring the defense "to make 
some plausible showing of how the requested witness would be material and favorable 
to the defense." 14 M.J. at 847 (footnote omitted). 
4SOSee United States v. Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225, 230 (C.M.A. 1979) (Cook, J., 
concurring in part, dissenting in part); United States v. Johnson, 3 M.J. 772, 775 
(A.C.M.R. 1977) (DeFord, J., dissenting). 
4S1United Statesv. Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225, 230(C.M.A.1979)(Cook, J., concurring 
in part, dissenting in part); United States v. Watkins, 5 M.J. 612, 614 (A.C.M.R.1978); 
United States v. Credit, 2 M.J. 631, 647 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 4 
M.J.118 (C.M.A. 1977), affdonremand, 6 M.J. 719 (A.F.C.M.R.1978), affd, 8 M.J.190 
(C.M.A. 1980). 
4S2See United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 71-72 (C.M.A.1980) (Cook, J.) (counsel was 
"remiss" in notcontactingthe witness); United States v. Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225, 230 
(C. M.A. 1979) (Cook, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
483United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77-78 (C. M.A. 1980). Judge Everett's conclu-
sion finds support in other cases. See United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239 (C.M.A. 
1977); United States v. Dixon, 8 M.J. 858 (N.C.M.R.1980); United States v. Christian, 
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of these requirements would produce a conflict with an accused's 
strategy and constitutional right to compulsory process" in some 
cases. 484 Interviewing the analyst may be impossible in some instan-
ces and strict compliance with paragraph 115 should not be required. 
As under Judge Fletcher's approach, this assumes that the analyst's 
personal testimony is inherently material on the weight given to the 
laboratory report.4ss 
While the views of each judge have merit, there is another 
approach that better reflects the issues involved. Instead of combin-
ing the questions of the analyst's qualifications and the test proce-
dures actually used, the two questions should be considered separ-
ately. In the abstract, the analyst's qualifications should seldom be at 
issue initially when the test involved is simple, as in the cases of 
counting sperm cells, blood typing, or drug analysis.486 If the test is 
complicated, such as neutron activation analysis or human leukocyte 
antigen testing, then the analyst's ability to perform the test and 
interpret the results becomes important.487 Depending on the com-
plexity of the test, the requisite showing of materiality and necessity 
in support of a defense request for the analyst should vary. If the test 
is a simple one, the defense should be required to interview the 
analyst before trial about his or qualifications and to show that the 
analyst's qualifications are inadequate to perform the test. The 
underlying presumption is that any analyst is capable of performing 
simple tests.488 When the test is more complex, the analyst's ability 
becomes more important; not everyone can do neutron activation 
analysis. Because the test results then depend more on the analyst's 
ability to do the test and read the results, the presumption of compe-
tency is weaker and the court should recognize that the analyst's 
qualifications are inherently material. As a result, though the 
defense request for the analyst should be as detailed as possible, the 
standard used in determining compliance with paragraph 115a 
should be lower. 
6 M.J. 624, 627 (A.C.M.R. 1978) (DeFord, J., concurring); United States v. Kilby, 3 
M.J. 938, 944-45 (N.C.M.R. 1977). 
484United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77 (C.M.A. 1980) (Everett, C.J., concurring in 
result). 
4SS/d. at 76-77 (Everett, C.J., concurring in result), 82 (Fletcher, J., concurring in 
result) (citing Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 619 n.143). 
486Qualification as an expert requires only that his or her testimony will help "the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Mil. R. Evid. 
702. The witness need not be the most expert or proficient in his field. United States v. 
Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1024 (6th Cir. 1977) (Fed. R. Evid. 702). Competency in this 
situation only involves the ability to perform the test. 
481See Imwinkelreid, supra note 470, at 278-83. 
488See Mil. R. Evid. 702. 
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A different standard should be applied when the defense wants to 
examine the analyst about the test procedures actually used. Because 
the test procedures can affect the test results,489 the defense should 
only have to meet a standard similar to that applied when the ana-
lyst's competency to perform or interpret a complex test is involved. 
Obviously, the defense should always try to determine before trial 
what the proper procedures are and whether they were used on that 
particular sample. But, in light of increasing evidence that forensic 
laboratories are incapable of accurately performing any but the 
simplest tests,490 a court should not be too eager to presume the test 
procedures are proper per se or that the proper procedures were 
actually used. If in the paragraph 115a request, the defense offers 
any evidence that the actual procedures were improper, the analyst 
should be required to testify.491 
Like many rules of evidence, this approach is based on assump-
tions about how various scientific tests are performed and who per-
forms them. The armed forces utilize "on the job training" to prepare 
many personnel to function within the armed forces. If a significant 
expansion in personnel forced hasty training of otherwise unquali-
fied personnel, it would be appropriate for military judges to assume 
that the qualifications of a forensic chemist, for example, should be 
in doubt until shown otherwise by the government. In effect, this 
would nullify the "presumption" that any normal analyst is capable 
of performing routine tests. 492 
IV. DEPOSITIONS AND INTERROGATORIES493 
Article 49 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice expressly au-
thorizes any party to take "oral or written depositions" unless pro hi-
489This includes careless handling, storage, and preparation of the evidence; 
improper procedures actually used; and improper procedures in theory. 
490See Imwinkelreid, supra note 470, at 267-69 (citing four surveys). The court of 
Military Appeals has presumed a regularity of handling and storage procedures in 
the chain of custody. United States v. Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225, 229 (C.M.A. 1979). 
(Fletcher, C.J.). 
491While it may be reasonable to be concerned about the degree of faith to be placed 
in an advocate's assertion, professional ethics limit counsel from calling witnesses who 
will give irrelevant or superfluous evidence. Courts should be reluctant to assume that 
a defense counsel's assertion of relevance and probative value is erroneous. 
492See note 488 supra. -
493U.C.M.J. art. 49 uses the expression "written deposition" to refer to what MCM, 
1969, para. 117 a and customary civilian practice refer to as written interrogatories. 
Interrogatories are covered by MCM, 1969, para.117c. 
79 
HeinOnline  -- 101 Mil. L. Rev. 80 1983
MILITARY LAW REVIEW [VOL.lOl 
bited from doing so by the military judge or other proper officer494 
and Military Rule of Evidence 804 permits the use in evidence of 
depositions under certain conditions. It is apparent that the intent of 
Article 49 was to utilize depositions m lieu of live testimony.495 
According to the terms of Article 49(d) a deposition may be used only 
when "the witness resides or is beyond the State, Territory Com-
monwealth, or District of Columbia in which the court ... is ordered 
to sit, or beyond 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing"496 or 
when the witness is actually unavailable or497 cannot be located.498 
The Court of Military Appeals has held that the geographic justifica-
tions for depositions are invalid insofar as they relate to service 
members499 and has strongly suggested that constitutional standards 
dictate the same result insofar as civilians are concerned.soo Thus, 
actual unavailability is necessary. Whatever the Article's original 
intent, the primary use of depositions is now clearly limited to pres-
494U.C.M.J. art. 49(a). See generally McGovern, The Military Oral Depositicm and 
Modern Communications, 45 Mil. L. Rev. 43 (1969); Everett, The Role of the Deposition 
in Military Justice. 7 Mil. L. Rev.131 (1960). The codal provision permits the taking of 
depositions unless the proper officer "forbids it for good cause". U.C.M.J. art. 49(a). 
MCM, 1969, para. 117b(1) requires that "any party may request permission to take 
oral depositions or, with the approval of the other party, written depositions", and that 
normally a request for permission will be submitted to the convening authority or 
other proper office in advance. Although MCM, 1969, para. 117b(3) echoes U.C.M.J. 
art. 49(a) in that a request may be denied for good cause, paragraph 117b as a whole 
appears to place the onus on the requestor, a result seemingly in violation of U .C.M.J. 
art. 49(a). 
If the case is being tried as a capital case, only the defense may utilize depositions, 
U.C.M.J. arts. 4(d)-(f). 
49Slt is probable that depositions were intially used to obtain the testimony of 
military witnesses stationed far from the situs of trial, see, e.g., J. Winthrop Military 
Law and Precedents 352-53 (2d ed. 1896, 1920 reprint), and to obtain the testimony of 
civilians who were not subject to compulsory process as no general statute providing 
for such process existed. Id. at 352 n.55, 353 n.58. The accused apparently had not 
right to attend the deposition, at least not at government expense. Id. at 355-57. 
4ssu.C.M.J. art. 49(d)(1). See note 502 supra. 
497U.C.M.J. art. 49(d)(2) (permits depositions when the witness "by reason of death, 
age, sickness, bodily infirmity, imprisonment, military necessity, nonamendability to 
process, or other reasonable cause is unable or refuses to appear ... "). The current 
approach ofthe Court of Military Appeals to "military necessity" in the general area of 
witness procurement suggests that, absent declared war, it is improbable that deposi-
tions will be justified by military necessity. 
4ssu.C.M.J. art. 46(d)(3). 
499See note 269 supra. 
5°0/d. Although Mil. R. Evid. 804(a) is illustrative rather than limiting, its express 
enumeration ofU.C.M.J. art. 49(d)(2) and silence as to Article 49(d)(2), suggests that a 
deposition obtained under Article 49(d)(1) may be inadmissible under the Military 
Rules of Evidence. 
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ervation of testimony. 501 It was the intent of Congress that no deposi-
tion take place unless the accused is given the opportunity to attend5°2 
and military law gives the accused the right to attend the deposition 
with counsel. 503 Under these circumstances, the accused's confronta-
tion right is protected as the accused is both present at a prosecution 
deposition and has the right through counsel to cross-examine the 
witness to be deposed. What the accused loses is the ability to conduct 
the cross-examination before the court-members. In a particular 
case, this loss of demeanor evidence may be harmful, but if the 
witness is actually unavailable for trial, the accused would seem to 
have no cognizable constitutional complaint. A similar result follows 
from a compulsory process examination. Of course, should the wit-
ness not be actually unavailable, as when the witness has been ren-
dered unavailable due to reassignment to a military duty that 
another service member could perform as well, substantial confron-
tation and compulsory process problems may result. These matters 
should not arise under present law if only because the government 
pays an economic penalty for any attempt to use depositions in lieu of 
live testimony even if such use were acceptable under the confronta-
tion and compulsory process clauses. Acute problems may result in 
wartime, however, given the need for rapid mobility. 
Procedurally, the Code requires that reasonable written notice of 
the time and place of the deposition be given to those parties who 
have not requested the deposition504 and that "depositions may be 
taken before and authenticated by any military or civil officer autho-
rized ... to administer oaths."sos The Manual for Courts-Martial 
requires that oral depositions be recorded verbatim and normally be 
certified by the officer taking the deposition.sos Appropriate objec-
tions should be made during the deposition, but the deposing officer 
is not to rule upon them; they are merely to be recorded for later 
resolution.5°7 Although, absent actual unavailability, the defense 
501See, e.g., MCM, 1969, para. 117a ("Depositions normally are taken to preserve 
testimony of witnesses whose availability at the time of trial appears uncertain.") It is 
possible to use the coercive nature of depositions as a discovery device except that it is 
not likely that such a deposition would be approved. 
502 Uniform Code of Military Justice, Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House 
Comm. on Armed Services on H.R. fJ498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 696 (1949) (statement of 
Rep. Elston). 
soaunited States v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 248,253,29 C.M.R. 244,249 (1960). Jacoby has 
been codified in MCM, 1969, para. 117b(2), which declares that the right to counsei 
held by an accused at a deposition is the same as that prescribed for trial by the type of 
court-martial before which the deposition is to be used. 
50-IU.C.M.J. art. 49(b); MCM, 1969, para.117b(4) permitsserviceofnoticeon counsel. 
sosu.C.M.J. art. 49(c); MCM, 1969, para. 117b(8). 
506/d. atpara.117d. 
so1 !d. at para. 117b(7). 
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generally has the right to prohibit the receipt into evidence of a 
deposition, trial tactics are often such that the defense has no particu-
lar reason to object to the use of depositions provided that the testi-
mony of the witness can carry sufficient persuasive effect. Given the 
widespread availability of videotape recorders in the modern society 
and the armed forces, both trial and defense counsel should make 
increasing use of videotaped depositions.508 Such depositions can 
save substantial amounts of trial time, may be edited following the 
military judge's ruling on objections, and will convey the demeanor 
of the witness to the fact finder. Indeed, given mutual consent, whole 
portions of trial can be presented in this fashion. 509 
V. CONCLUSION 
Like the civilian legal system, the military criminal legal system is 
a complex amalgam of statute, executive order, rule, and custom. 
Descended from a disciplinary system perhaps more concerned with 
certainty and rapid disposition than due process, contemporary mil-
itary justice provides the accused with protections equal to or super-
ior to that afforded by civilian justice. Yet, like the civilian legal 
system, further constitutional change is in the wind as the confronta-
tion and compulsory process clauses of the Constitution not only 
weigh in the balance the military's unique procedures for obtaining 
defense evidence, but also delimit what the ordinary rules of evi-
dence may prescribe. 
508See McGovern, The Military Oral Deposition and Modern Communications, 45 
Mil. L. Rev. 43, 59-75 (1969). 
5090ne entire civilian criminal trial has been conducted in this fashion by Judge 
McCrystal in Ohio. Numerous civil cases have also been so conducted. Because of the 
ability to present edited videotapes to juries, substantial amounts of juror and trial 
time have been saved. 
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